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  INTRODUCTION   
The operation of the criminal justice system has shifted dra-
matically without the change drawing widespread attention. To 
a significant extent, decisions about whether an accused will go 
to prison no longer depend on an adjudication of the facts under-
lying the criminal charge. Instead, such decisions rest on a de-
fendant’s ability to follow the rules of a future-oriented testing 
period created and overseen by the presiding court. 
In this modern testing system, judges and prosecutors pre-
scribe the prospective rules that defendants must follow in order 
to avoid prison. Typical rules include: do not use drugs or alcohol, 
do not get rearrested, stay away from a specific person, do not 
associate with criminals, follow the requirements of your treat-
ment program, and get yourself to appointments on time. The 
procedural opportunity created by the test is framed as a prom-
ise: Defendants are promised that they will remain at liberty if 
they can follow the rules during the allotted period. The incen-
tive posed by this promise often proves irresistible, even when 
the price of participating is high.  
This method of testing defendants, while sidestepping trials, 
is deeply compatible with plea bargaining; the tests increase the 
range of options defendants can consider as alternatives to in-
voking their jury trial rights. At the same time, the tests ratchet 
up the authority available to prosecutors and judges in what the 
U.S. Supreme Court has termed our “system of pleas.”1  
 
 1. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). 
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The popularity of these tests is shifting the orientation of 
decision-making in criminal cases from a retrospective analysis, 
to a prospective one. In each of the testing arrangements I ex-
plore in this Article, the locus of the punishment inquiry shifts 
towards the results of a forward-looking test—and away from a 
backward-looking evaluation of the facts of the criminal charge. 
This transformation alters the societal, personal, and other fac-
tors that determine who goes to prison and why, but little anal-
ysis or conversation has occurred about the consequences of this 
shift. 
This Article sets out to identify the core features of this mod-
ern testing system, which is transforming decision-making in 
criminal cases and turning criminal procedure on its head. Un-
der this system, it is defendants’ characters, not their crimes, 
that go on trial. But to date, no one has catalogued the changes 
the system has wrought or isolated the factors that now impact 
outcomes for defendants on a mass scale.  
Part of the problem is that testing mechanisms go by many 
different names, including probation, problem-solving courts, 
conditional plea agreements, deferred adjudication, caps, condi-
tional discharge, and the fully suspended sentence. The use of 
dissimilar names for similar mechanisms hides the connections 
among states’ practices, and among the procedures employed 
within a state. Weeding out the parallels (and differences) can 
be a dizzying and complex task.  
In this Article, I introduce the concept of “Testing Periods” 
to help create order out of this chaos. By Testing Period, I mean 
the time period during which a criminal defendant undergoes a 
test in the hopes of achieving a desired outcome in his or her 
case. Under the standard arrangement, the defendant agrees to 
plead guilty and to undergo the test, and the judge agrees not to 
send the defendant to prison if he or she succeeds during the 
Testing Period.2 
To elucidate the concept of the Testing Period, I draw on the 
history and theory of probation, one of the earliest and most 
 
 2. The Testing Periods I analyze in this Article require upfront guilty 
pleas, but the Testing Period framework applies to other testing devices used to 
sort people in the criminal justice system, including bail conditions, protective 
order conditions, pre-plea diversionary programs, and parole conditions. Each 
of these mechanisms creates a Testing Period that allows system administra-
tors to sort people for the necessity of conviction and/or for the appropriate de-
gree of punishment. I would like to investigate these Testing Periods in future 
work. 
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prominent testing methods. The dictionary defines probation as 
an “act of testing”3 because at its core, probation has always rep-
resented the chance to avoid prison by passing a test. The crim-
inal justice system uses probation to set up a Testing Period in 
which a defendant has the opportunity to demonstrate that his 
or her punishment should not include prison.  
The central role that Testing Periods now play in the crimi-
nal justice system was foretold by the early history of plea bar-
gaining in U.S. courts. Indeed, as George Fisher has observed, 
prosecutors used the original Testing Period (probation) to in-
vent plea bargaining in the first instance.4 In a celebrated ac-
count of the historical rise of plea bargaining, Fisher explained 
how probation emerged “in symbiosis with plea bargaining” and 
established itself as one of plea bargaining’s “most dependable 
foot soldiers” by the end of the nineteenth century.5 Plea bar-
gaining came into being by offering defendants the opportunity 
to “test” their way out of prison; plea bargaining and probation 
took shape together as two sides of the same coin. As plea bar-
gaining has increasingly displaced adjudication in the criminal 
justice system, it should not be surprising that the use of Testing 
Periods has similarly exploded. 
A wide range of contemporary Testing Periods can be traced 
back to the early alliance between plea bargaining and proba-
tion. For the purposes of this Article, I divide these Testing Pe-
riods into two categories: those that operate between the guilty 
plea and the sentence, and those that operate as the sentence. I 
use the term “on-file model” to characterize Testing Periods that 
operate between the guilty plea and the imposition of sentence. 
I do so because the first recorded examples of probation in the 
1830s operated in this manner and were known as putting cases 
“on file.”6 I use the term “sentenced model” to characterize Test-
ing Periods that sort defendants through the sentence itself. A 
1900 Massachusetts statute created a new form of “probation” 
that allowed courts to impose a Testing Period as a sentence in 
its own right.7 Because this form of probation spread rapidly 
 
 3. See Probation, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
probation (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 4. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 942, 
1044 (2000). 
 5. Id. at 860, 866. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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among the states, the word “probation” is now linked more 
closely to the “sentenced” model than to the “on-file” model. 
Whenever courts impose a sentence that creates a Testing Pe-
riod, they are following the “sentenced” model.  
Ironically, many of the newest sorting mechanisms in the 
criminal justice system—including those used in a range of prob-
lem-solving courts (like drug courts)—follow the old “on-file” 
model. Defendants typically have to plead guilty as the price of 
entering these courts. They then undergo a Testing Period in ad-
vance of sentencing so that the court can sort them into one of 
two categories—those who will go to prison and those who will 
not. 
This Article is the first to articulate the framework of Test-
ing Periods and to illuminate the critical intersection between 
plea bargaining and the broad range of testing mechanisms that 
have arisen in conjunction with guilty pleas. Mapping this inter-
section is arguably the most important challenge facing those 
seeking to understand the criminal justice system today. Ninety-
four percent of state convictions are now the result of guilty 
pleas,8 and the vast majority of those who plead guilty do so in 
exchange for a Testing Period, not a term of incarceration.9 
Using Connecticut as an entry point, I identify six different 
mechanisms that create Testing Periods: probation, conditional 
discharge, plea-and-withdraw offers, caps, drug courts, and con-
ditional plea agreements. These mechanisms vary in their de-
tails and are not routinely viewed as similar structures, but in 
fact they share essential traits: (1) defendants must follow rules 
(such as staying away from drugs or alcohol) to pass a court-
monitored test; and (2) the inquiry for the court’s incarceration 
decision is based on the defendant’s performance on the test, not 
on the underlying facts of the alleged criminal conduct. After ex-
amining the impact of these mechanisms in Connecticut, I ex-
tend my analysis to other key states, including New York, Cali-
fornia, and Texas, to lay out the scale of the shift that has 
occurred in criminal law determinations nationwide. 
Importantly, in examining Testing Periods, I am concerned 
with both the dynamics that surround the decision to plead 
guilty, and the dynamics created as a consequence of the plea. 
 
 8. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).  
 9. Probation is just one form of Testing Period, and the probation popula-
tion (standing alone) far exceeds the prison population. See discussion infra Part 
I.A. 
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As I shall demonstrate, prosecutors and judges have been able 
to mold Testing Periods in ways that maximize their decision-
making authority not only in the present, but also in the future.  
Testing Periods facilitate guilty pleas because they allow 
prosecutors and judges to dangle the possibility of no prison time 
in front of a defendant. It turns out that defendants will accept 
nearly any arrangement as long as it provides them the oppor-
tunity to avoid going to prison. The possibility of avoiding prison 
is so strong an incentive for defendants that little else is required 
to counteract the scope of the concessions that judges and prose-
cutors have been able to demand from defendants in exchange.10  
The Testing Period tool, by giving defendants a chance to 
avoid prison, has greased the wheels of many different plea bar-
gaining arrangements. In particular, the tantalizing prospect of 
a fully suspended sentence has encouraged people to gamble 
with their ability to stay out of trouble in the future in exchange 
for the certainty of avoiding prison today. In taking this gamble, 
defendants can make themselves easy targets for punitive action 
down the road. 
To be clear, for the right defendants in the right circum-
stances, Testing Periods open up an otherwise unavailable path-
way out of prison.11 But for defendants facing addiction, mental 
health issues, or disadvantaged social circumstances, the “test” 
may be stacked against them from the beginning.12 Given the 
high stakes, careful attention needs to be paid to the criteria that 
are being used in Testing Periods to sort defendants into the sys-
tem’s winners and losers. 
My analysis of modern Testing Periods reveals many sur-
prising parallels with a much older method of resolving criminal 
 
 10. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 11. Many defendants successfully navigate the terms of their Testing Peri-
ods, and many defendants do not. Because defendants generally do not appeal 
successful Testing Periods, these Testing Periods are not as likely to show up in 
the case law.  
 12. See, e.g., Michelle S. Phelps, Mass Probation and Inequality: Race, 
Class, and Gender Disparities in Supervision and Revocation, in 2 HANDBOOK 
ON PUNISHMENT DECISIONS: LOCATIONS OF DISPARITY 43, 44 (Jeffery T. Ulmer 
& Mindy S. Bradley eds., 2018) (discussing research showing that adults with 
more privilege are better equipped to meet the requirements of probation and 
analyzing the role of probation “in stratifying outcomes in the criminal justice 
system, providing an off-ramp for some and a conveyer belt toward prison for 
others”). 
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cases: the testing models manifested through the medieval or-
deal.13 The accused who underwent a medieval ordeal was 
known as a “proband,” a word that comes from the same root as 
probation. Both words are based on the Latin “probare,” which 
means to test or to prove.14 A proband, like a probationer, was 
the person being tested.  
As I will demonstrate at the end of this Article, trial by or-
deal was a method of testing accused people (and particularly 
low-status accused people) to reveal whether they were “dirty” 
or “clean.” In administering an ordeal, priests would engage in a 
careful inspection of the proband’s body to report if the proband 
was “clean,” and thus vindicated by God’s judgment, or if it was 
necessary for the proband to be led away “guilty and unclean” 
for punishment.15  
Modern Testing Periods also focus heavily on divining 
whether the accused should be labeled dirty or clean.16 In today’s 
world, probationers (and drug court defendants) routinely uri-
nate into cups in front of court officers so that their urine can be 
inspected and catalogued as “dirty” or “clean.” As in the days of 
the ordeal, the results of that test allow the unclean to be led 
away for punishment.  
This Article has four parts. In Part I, I explore the history of 
Testing Periods and their role in shaping decision-making in 
criminal cases. In Part II, I draw on a concrete analysis of Test-
ing Periods in Connecticut to demonstrate how they are deployed 
to: (1) facilitate guilty pleas; and (2) fashion outcomes for defend-
ants based on their ability to follow a set of prospective rules. In 
 
 13. See discussion infra Part IV (examining the use of the ordeal as a pro-
cedural tool to sort defendants for punishment). 
 14. See Proband (n.), ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www 
.etymonline.com/search?q=proband (last visited Mar. 14, 2019); Probation (n.), 
ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/ 
probation#etymonline_v_2591 (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 2–4, State v. Jones, Nos. N23N-CR18-
0186054S & N23N-CR18-0186942S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2018) (reflecting 
that the court informed the defendant that it “is critical that you have good at-
tendance record [at drug treatment] and that your urinalysis comes back clean” 
in order to maintain release status on bond and warned the defendant that “de-
pending on how you do going forward will impact the type of sentence you get 
in this case”); Transcript of Record at 8, State v. Nicholson, No. N23N-CR17-
0174135-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2017) (indicating that the defendant con-
firmed his understanding that “[n]ot showing up” and “[d]irty urines” are viola-
tions of probation conditions). 
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Part III, I show how the Testing Period dynamics I highlight in 
Connecticut also shape outcomes in other states across the coun-
try. In Part IV, I rely on scholarship about the medieval ordeal 
to raise questions about the purposes that Testing Periods serve, 
the criteria they use to sort defendants, and the societal players 
they empower and disempower.  
I.  THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF TESTING PERIODS   
In George Fisher’s seminal work on the triumph of plea bar-
gaining, he argued that plea bargaining came to dominate the 
criminal courts because “it served the interests of the power-
ful.”17 In particular, plea bargaining increased the power availa-
ble to prosecutors and judges to control case outcomes—most vis-
ibly by removing the jury, the most democratic element of the 
system, from the equation. The ability to control case outcomes, 
however, requires power along two dimensions: the power to per-
suade defendants to plead guilty and the power to set the terms 
of their sentences. Since its earliest days, plea bargaining has 
served both ends; it operates as a mechanism for convincing de-
fendants to waive their jury trial rights, and as a font of the 
power that has always “mattered most” in “the battlefield of the 
criminal courts”: the authority to dictate sentences.18 
Fisher’s account of how prosecutors and judges developed 
the ability to control case outcomes is inextricably linked with 
the history of probation. He explains that “the birth of probation” 
was in significant measure “the work of prosecutors who sought 
a new way to expand their power to bargain for pleas.”19 Backed 
by judges as well as prosecutors, probation rose in tandem with 
plea bargaining and ripened into “one of the most useful tools of 
lawyers cutting deals.”20  
In the next Section, I draw on the history of probation, which 
Fisher used to illuminate the power dynamics behind plea bar-
gaining’s rise, but I reframe that history as the history of the 
Testing Period. I do so because a broad range of contemporary 
testing instruments, which are not called “probation” within 
state systems or analyzed in state case law as “probation,” derive 
from this same essential history. Although probation continues 
 
 17. Fisher, supra note 4, at 859. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 860. 
 20. Id. at 860, 866. 
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to play a key role as the foundational (and arguably most im-
portant) Testing Period, the use of Testing Periods extends far 
beyond what is characterized as “probation” within state sys-
tems. For this reason, “probation” is too limited a term to capture 
the plethora of sorting devices that courts now use to determine 
case outcomes.  
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TESTING PERIODS 
The modern history of Testing Periods begins with the emer-
gence of probation in Massachusetts. Massachusetts is known as 
the birthplace of probation because the earliest recorded exam-
ples of probation have been found in its records.21 In Fisher’s 
words, “prosecutors [in Massachusetts] raised up probation as a 
sibling of plea bargaining and shaped it to do plea bargaining’s 
bidding.”22 
Scholars have cited the arrangement that lay behind an 
1830 guilty plea—by a defendant named Jerusha Chase in Mas-
sachusetts—as the first recorded example of probation, although 
the word “probation” was not in use at the time.23 Chase was 
charged in the old Municipal Court of Boston with stealing a 
plaid cloak from a dwelling house.24 On February 8, 1830, she 
agreed to plead guilty to that charge, and the prosecutor agreed 
not to move for her sentencing in the wake of her guilty plea.25 
Instead, the case was put “on file” and Chase was released on the 
condition that she “come when sent for and in the meantime keep 
the peace and be of good behavior towards all the Citizens” of the 
Commonwealth.26 Two of her supporters stood as sureties on the 
 
 21. 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RE-
LEASE PROCEDURES: PROBATION 16 (1939) (“[P]robation in the United States 
has no early history apart from the development of the Massachusetts system.”). 
 22. Fisher, supra note 4, at 942. 
 23. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 64, 68, 76, 83–84 
(2003); Frank W. Grinnell, The Common Law History of Probation: An Illustra-
tion of the Equitable Growth of Criminal Law, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
15, 22 (1941). From my review of records in the Boston archives, it is apparent 
that cases were placed on file earlier than 1830, but the practice was litigated 
in the Chase case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grace Gale, Docket Book, Munic-
ipal Court of Boston, August Term 1829 (case ordered to lay on file on August 
13, 1829) (on file with author). 
 24. Indictment against Jerusha Chase, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
January 1830 (on file with author). 
 25. Grinnell, supra note 23, at 23. 
 26. Indictment against Jerusha Chase, supra note 24; see also PETER OX-
ENBRIDGE THACHER, REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CASES, TRIED IN THE MUNICIPAL 
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deal, agreeing to forfeit $200 if she violated these conditions.27 
The case was then “suffered to sleep upon the files of the court” 
unless and until the prosecutor decided to move for her sentenc-
ing at a later date.28  
As I will describe below, this “on file” mechanism was the 
earliest iteration of a practice that the authorities in Massachu-
setts would later refer to as “probation.”29 As exemplified by the 
Chase case, the “on file” mechanism operated between the guilty 
plea and the sentence. The defendant would agree to plead 
guilty, and the prosecutor would agree to put the case on file, 
which meant allowing the defendant to stay out of prison subject 
to a set of conditions. To be eligible for this arrangement, the 
defendant would have to produce a surety willing to stake money 
on the defendant’s ability to meet the conditions. If a prosecutor 
later came to believe that a defendant had violated one of the 
conditions, that prosecutor could move for the defendant to be 
sentenced on the guilty plea.  
The ability to put a case on file was a useful procedural de-
vice for prosecutors on many levels, as it gave them a highly ef-
ficient tool to encourage defendants to plead guilty. By entering 
a guilty plea, the defendant eased the prosecutor’s workload, 
protected the prosecutor from making mistakes at trial, and fore-
closed the possibility of acquittal.30 Guilty pleas also shielded 
prosecutors from having to subpoena witnesses who were reluc-
tant to testify at trial. The fact that defendants admitted their 
guilt, moreover, served to eliminate any formal doubt that they 
were in fact guilty. These admissions increased the legitimacy of 
prosecutors’ victories, heightening their prestige and advancing 
their overall professional reputations.31 
By the 1840s, the opportunity presented by the “on file” 
methodology began to spread to more marginalized defendants, 
those with no surety to stand for them. In 1841, John Augustus, 
a Boston cobbler, volunteered to serve as a surety for an indigent 
 
COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, BEFORE PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER 267–68 
(Horatio Woodman ed., 1845). 
 27. Grinnell, supra note 23, at 23. 
 28. THACHER, supra note 26, at 268. 
 29. Fisher, supra note 4, at 941–42 (“For putting cases on file was proba-
tion. It was not merely an ideological forebear of the system of probation that 
first found expression in a Massachusetts statute of 1878. It was, as a matter of 
court procedure, the selfsame thing.”). 
 30. FISHER, supra note 23, at 16. 
 31. Id. (laying out the benefits of plea bargaining for prosecutors). 
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defendant whom he met in court one morning.32 Augustus’s de-
cision to fill in as surety—for a defendant whom he did not know 
personally—was a critical step in the early expansion of the “on-
file” methodology.33 
Augustus’s first case involved a man who was accused of be-
ing a “common drunkard.”34 Augustus was in court when he saw 
this “ragged and wretched looking man” sitting on a bench allot-
ted for prisoners.35 The man’s offense was “yielding to his appe-
tite for intoxicating drinks,” but he told Augustus that he “never 
again would taste intoxicating liquors” if he could be saved from 
the House of Correction.36 Augustus agreed to serve as his 
surety, and the man was released and ordered to appear in court 
in three weeks.37 According to Augustus, the defendant “signed 
the pledge and became a sober man.”38 The judge was so pleased 
by this transformation that he imposed a fine of one cent and 
costs ($3.76), rather than the usual term of incarceration.39  
In the ensuing years, Augustus stepped in as surety for 
many other impoverished defendants in the Boston courts.40 
This intervention made it possible for prosecutors to place these 
cases on file during what Augustus termed “a season of proba-
tion.”41 For this reason, scholars have credited Augustus with 
introducing the word “probation” into the criminal law.42 Be-
cause of his role, Augustus is known as the “first probation of-
ficer” and the “father of probation.”43  
These titles are appropriate not only because Augustus 
sought to extend what he called probation to the poor, but also 
 
 32. JOHN AUGUSTUS, JOHN AUGUSTUS: FIRST PROBATION OFFICER 4–5 
(1972). 
 33. FISHER, supra note 23, at 85, 280–81 n.105 (analyzing Augustus’s prac-
tices as in line with the on-file system); Grinnell, supra note 23, at 24–25. 
 34. AUGUSTUS, supra note 32, at 5. 
 35. Id. at 4. 
 36. Id. at 5. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. Fisher, supra note 4, at 959. 
 42. See, e.g., PAUL F. CROMWELL, JR. ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that Augustus “was the first 
to apply the term ‘probation’” to his method).  
 43. AUGUSTUS, supra note 32, at ix; CROMWELL, supra note 42, at 10. As I 
explain in Part IV, however, the term “proband” dates back to the medieval trial 
by ordeal. 
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because of his focus on temperance. After the success of his first 
case, Augustus continued to work exclusively on drunkard cases 
for the next two years.44 From its earliest days, probation has 
been used as a tool to sort (mostly indigent) defendants for their 
ability (or inability) to abstain from intoxicants.  
Augustus’s role in facilitating a testing process for defend-
ants on this basis is reflected in a contemporaneous account of 
his methodology in court.45 In a case he later highlighted as rep-
resentative, Augustus volunteered to be the surety for a man 
whom a witness indicated “generally gets drunk in the morning 
and commences a new drunk before the old one is half over.”46 
The judge was skeptical that this man was capable of change, 
asking Augustus: “Do you think it worth while to give him a 
trial? He appears to be a broken down man.”47 Augustus replied 
that he was willing to take a chance: “I will be his bail for three 
weeks, from this day at eleven o’clock . . . and if at that time he 
is not an altered man, I will willingly consent to his becoming an 
inmate of the House of Correction.”48 
This approach, as framed by the first volunteer probation 
officer, would become the defining philosophy of probation-de-
rived systems. If a defendant could obey the rules of the Testing 
Period going forward, that defendant would not go to prison. But 
failure permitted the judge and prosecutor to wash their hands 
of the matter: semantically, by failing the test, the defendant had 
earned his or her own place in prison. 
In the late nineteenth century, Massachusetts began to 
standardize the use of probation by statute, while professional-
izing the probation officer’s role. An 1878 act, the first statute to 
contain the word “probation,” allowed Boston’s mayor to appoint 
a paid probation officer to assist the courts.49 The officer would 
recommend defendants for “plac[ement] on probation.”50 The of-
ficer would also work to ensure that probationers met the condi-
tions that formed their obligations under the deal.51  
 
 44. AUGUSTUS, supra note 32, at x. 
 45. See id. at 56. 
 46. Id. at 47, 55. 
 47. Id. at 56. 
 48. Id. at 57. 
 49. Grinnell, supra note 23, at 28. 
 50. Act of Apr. 26, 1878, ch. 198, § 1, 1878 Mass. Acts 146, 147. 
 51. Id. 
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As probation was codified into statute, the Massachusetts 
legislature began granting judges more power over the decision 
to place a defendant on probation.52 The inaugural 1878 act, 
which focused on the Boston area, referred to “offenders placed 
on probation by the court.”53 A subsequent 1880 statute, which 
extended the availability of probation throughout the state, au-
thorized courts to “permit the accused to be placed on probation, 
upon such terms as it may deem best.”54  
Importantly, as more statutes were enacted, probation 
evolved to become a sentence in its own right, in addition to serv-
ing as a mechanism for staving off a sentence. The initial stat-
utes in Massachusetts did nothing to alter the early practice of 
placing defendants in a Testing Period after they had pled guilty, 
but before they were sentenced by the court—the “on-file” 
model.55 A 1900 statute, however, authorized Massachusetts 
judges to also sentence a defendant to probation.56 This new 
model involved imposing a prison sentence and then suspending 
execution of that sentence while the defendant served a period 
of probation.57 If the defendant met the court’s conditions, the 
prison sentence would remain suspended.58 But if the defendant 
failed to meet those conditions, the court could revoke probation 
and execute the prison term.59  
Over time, this model of imposing probation in conjunction 
with a suspended sentence appeared more regularly in legisla-
tion than the “on-file” model.60 By 1925, all forty-eight states and 
 
 52. Whether the prosecutor or the judge had unilateral, exclusive, or shared 
authority to place a case on file and/or proceed to sentencing (based on an al-
leged violation of an on-file condition) evolved over time and place. See FISHER, 
supra note 23, at 67–89 (discussing and parsing evidence on the balance of au-
thority between the prosecutor and judge in controlling the use of the on-file 
mechanism in Massachusetts). By the end of the 19th century, “[a] fair amount 
of evidence suggests” that “the judge had more power than before to place a case 
on probation in the face of the district attorney’s opposition.” Id. at 87. “[T]he 
probation statutes of the last quarter of the century tipped the balance of pro-
bationary power toward the court.” Id. 
 53. Ch. 198, § 1, 1878 Mass. Acts at 147. 
 54. Act of Mar. 22, 1880, ch. 129, § 4, 1880 Mass. Acts 87, 87; FISHER, supra 
note 23, at 87 (discussing early statutes in Massachusetts). 
 55. Frank W. Grinnell, Probation as an Orthodox Common Law Practice in 
Massachusetts Prior to the Statutory System, 2 MASS. L.Q. 591, 614 (1917). 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. (reporting that the change in practice that authorized courts to 
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the federal government had enacted probation statutes.61 The 
prevailing model authorized judges to sentence a defendant to a 
term of probation while simultaneously suspending the imposi-
tion or the execution of a prison term.62 This is what I call the 
“sentenced” model, to distinguish it from the older “on-file” 
model. 
Once probation’s availability became more predictable, the 
opportunities and costs presented by probation were incorpo-
rated into the negotiation process. After a while, “no defendant 
needed to be told that a guilty plea was the purchase price of the 
hope of probation.”63 The rules of the game had become obvious 
to all of the actors in the court.64  
Probation’s effectiveness in facilitating guilty pleas served 
the interests of judges, as much as of prosecutors. Guilty pleas 
were much less taxing on judicial resources than trials, with 
 
suspend the execution of a prison sentence became “general under statutory sys-
tems in the country”). 
 61. See CROMWELL, supra note 42, at 12. 
 62. Id. at 12–17 (discussing early probation statutes in the federal govern-
ment, California, Illinois, New York, and Texas); KELLY LYN MITCHELL ET AL., 
ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PROBATION 
REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 21 STATES 6 (2014) (“In a 
majority of states surveyed in this report, probation is understood to be a com-
ponent of a suspended (or stayed) prison sentence—and usually states have 
more than one way to suspend a sentence. Less commonly, probation is consid-
ered to be a free-standing sanction in its own right, and may be imposed by 
sentencing courts without pairing it with a suspended prison term. Some states 
allow for both suspended sentences and free-standing probation.”). 
 63. FISHER, supra note 23, at 89. 
 64. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 9 
(1979) (describing the prevailing methodology of resolving cases in New Haven 
during the 1970s: “I can get you a suspended sentence if you’ll cop the plea.”); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870–1910, at 181 
(1981) (“Clearly, a guilty plea opened the doors to probation. Word of this must 
have gotten around to defendants and defense. The message—‘plead guilty’—
rang through loud and clear.”); id. at 226–27 (describing the “unwritten rule” 
that “for any reasonable chance at probation, you must plead guilty”; quoting a 
defendant tell a judge in 1910 in Alameda County, California that “I pleaded 
guilty because you can’t try to get probation otherwise”; and concluding that 
probation “gave the guilty plea a powerful thrust”); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CON-
SCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRES-
SIVE AMERICA 78 (1980) (“[M]any persons, perhaps even most, faced with a 
choice between probation and a trial with the possibility of a prison sentence, 
would accept the bargain: better to suffer the inconvenience of reporting to a 
probation officer than to risk incarceration.”). 
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their cumbersome adversarial procedures and complex eviden-
tiary rules.65 They also protected judges, as well as prosecutors, 
from the risk of reversal on appeal.66 The conditional nature of 
probation, moreover, preserved for judges the ultimate power 
over defendants who were alleged to have violated the rules of 
the Testing Period: judges retained the right to send probation-
ers to prison for violating any of the conditions that judges, 
themselves, had the authority to devise. By feeding into the in-
centives of the courtroom’s most powerful actors, probation cre-
ated a sentencing structure that allowed plea bargaining to 
thrive.67 
Once plea bargaining—and its instrument, probation—
gained a foothold in the courts, they rose to dominance in tan-
dem. By 1968, approximately ninety percent of defendants were 
being convicted by guilty plea, and that number would only con-
tinue to rise.68 By 2012, ninety-four percent of state convictions 
were the result of guilty pleas.69 And most of the people who were 
agreeing to plead guilty did so in exchange for probation, rather 
than for a reduced sentence of incarceration. The chart below, 
which relies on data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 




 65. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the 
Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 206 (1979) (“The vast elaboration of ad-
versary procedure and the law of evidence has made [U.S.] constitutionally 
guaranteed trial procedure so costly that it can be used in only a tiny fraction of 
cases of serious crime.”). 
 66. Fisher, supra note 4, at 1042–43. 
 67. FISHER, supra note 23, at 90. 
 68. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 50, 50 (1968). 
 69. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).  
 70. MICHAEL P. JACOBSON, VINCENT SCHIRALDI, REAGAN DALY & EMILY 
HOTEZ, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., LESS IS MORE: HOW REDUCING PROBATION 
POPULATIONS CAN IMPROVE OUTCOMES 7 fig.1 (2017). It should be noted that 
most of the jail inmates are pretrial inmates. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250394, JAIL IN-
MATES IN 2015, at 4–5 tbls.3 & 4 (Brigitte Coulton ed., 2016) (reporting that 
37.3% of 693,300 jail inmates were convicted). 
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National Trends in Probation, Prison, and Jail Populations 
(Based on Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Data, 1980–2014) 
 
BJS’s probation tally, however, does not capture the full ex-
tent of the relationship between Testing Periods and plea bar-
gaining. In gathering its probation statistics, BJS asks jurisdic-
tions to include “all adults regardless of conviction status, who 
have been placed under the supervision of a probation agency as 
part of a court order.”71 This definition, which references the in-
volvement of a probation agency, means that the statistics on 
probation underrepresent the correlation between plea bargain-
ing and the range of Testing Periods that I am exploring in this 
Article. 
The BJS statistics on “probation” exclude people in both the 
“sentenced” model and the “on-file” model. First, the BJS defini-
tion of probation does not explicitly include sentencing devices 
like a conditional discharge that do not come under the supervi-
sion of a probation agency.72 As I will explain in Part II, a condi-
tional discharge is a sentence used in some states to impose con-
ditions on a defendant without the involvement of a probation 
 
 71. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMB No. 
1121-0064, FORM CJ-8 2015 ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY 1 (2015), https://www 
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cj8_15.pdf. 
 72. Id. (asking states to include probationers on both active and inactive 
supervision status, but not directing states to include people subject to condi-
tions, imposed as part of the sentence, that are outside the jurisdiction of a pro-
bation agency). 
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agency.73 The judge imposes these conditions to maintain a “ju-
risdictional hold” over the defendant,74 creating a Testing Period 
that operates as the sentence.  
Second, the BJS definition of probation fails to capture 
many of the “on-file” models that now pervade state plea bar-
gaining practices. As I will explore in detail, many plea bargain-
ing systems—including those deployed in a range of problem-
solving (or alternative) courts—follow the “on-file” model.75 Ap-
plying classic “on-file” methodology, many of these courts accept 
only defendants who agree to plead guilty and use the defend-
ants’ performance in the Testing Period to determine (and jus-
tify) their sentences. But states often do not count defendants in 
problem-solving courts (and other on-file systems) as “on proba-
tion,” if they count them at all.76  
A related and ongoing problem is the lack of coherence sur-
rounding the word “probation,” which makes it an unruly cate-
gory on which to base data collection.77 Probation has become a 
term of art within individual jurisdictions, which have different 
understandings of who is on probation and who is not.78 The ab-
sence of standardized definitions and practices across jurisdic-
tions has prompted BJS to launch a census of adult probation 
supervising agencies in an attempt to enable more accurate data 
 
 73. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05 (McKinney 2017) (explaining that a 
court may impose conditional discharge upon determining probation supervi-
sion is unnecessary). Some states call a similar mechanism a conditional sen-
tence. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West 2017). 
 74. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a, ch. 952, pt. II, Refs & Annos (West 2019) 
(Comm’n Comment 1971). 
 75. See infra Part II.B. 
 76. Telephone interview by Elizabeth Leiserson with Thomas Bonczar, 
Statistician, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Oct. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Bonczar 
Interview] (noting that BJS cannot guarantee jurisdictions are reporting from 
alternative courts and that BJS does not count those who are not under the 
jurisdiction of a probation agency in the probation tally); Email from Danielle 
Kaeble, Statistician, Bureau of Justice Statistics, to Fiona Doherty (June 30, 
2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kaeble Email] (noting that BJS cannot 
control who is considered “on probation” from state to state). 
 77. MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 62, at 6 (“The legal conception and status 
of probation sentences is one of the most difficult things to determine accurately 
when looking at states across the country.”). 
 78. See, e.g., discussion infra Parts II.B & III.B (describing how one juris-
diction might call an on-file Testing Period “interim probation,” while another 
jurisdiction might call a similar Testing Period a “cap” or “deferred adjudica-
tion”). 
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collection.79 However, even this census, which was launched in 
2014 but then delayed,80 does not include probation agencies 
that supervise only misdemeanor cases, as the sheer number of 
these agencies made the project unwieldy.81 Probation will re-
main a messy category for many years to come. 
The complexities and caveats that accompany the word “pro-
bation” render it an inadequate vehicle upon which to build an 
analysis of modern testing systems. While probation inevitably 
sets up a Testing Period, many key Testing Periods are neither 
referred to nor conceived of as “probation.” I therefore depart 
from Fisher’s reliance on the word “probation” as an encapsulat-
ing term and use the concept of “Testing Periods” to facilitate a 
more comprehensive analysis across state systems.  
B. HARNESSING THE POWERS OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING 
The reliance on Testing Periods to determine outcomes in 
criminal cases changes the orientation of decision-making in 
these cases from a retrospective analysis, to a prospective one. I 
argue that the shift from retrospective to prospective decision-
making has produced indeterminate sentencing authority for 
prosecutors and judges. 
My focus on indeterminate sentencing represents a radical 
departure from Fisher’s formative account of the rise of plea bar-
gaining in U.S. courts.82 In tracing the history of plea bargain-
ing, Fisher relied on two interrelated factors to chart the growing 
tide of plea bargaining’s influence: the compatibility between 
plea bargaining and probation, and the incompatibility between 
plea bargaining and the indeterminate sentence.83 In Fisher’s 
telling, probation flourished because it increased the power of 
prosecutors and judges to control outcomes when negotiating 
cases.84 The indeterminate sentence, meanwhile, disappeared 
because it threatened to diminish the power of prosecutors and 
 
 79. See Kaeble Email, supra note 76. 
 80. See Census of Adult Probation Supervising Agencies, 2014, BUREAU 
JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.bjs.gov/content/capsa.cfm (last vis-
ited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 81. Bonczar Interview, supra note 76. 
 82. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 859–65. 
 83. Id. at 860, 942 (“The demise of the indeterminate sentence, one of the 
most promising of the late nineteenth century’s progressive brainchildren, bears 
the mark of plea bargaining’s malice.”). 
 84. Id. at 867. 
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judges to control those very same outcomes. Thus, according to 
Fisher, “[p]robation’s rise and the indeterminate sentence’s fall” 
are “two of plea bargaining’s victories.”85 
The notion that plea bargaining killed the indeterminate 
sentence, however, relies on an outdated understanding of inde-
terminacy. It is true that early forms of indeterminate sentenc-
ing—in which a parole board could shorten a prison sentence im-
posed by a judge—did not coexist easily with plea bargaining. As 
Fisher has explained, any system that relegated the power to 
determine the length of the sentence to a parole board would 
have “stripped both judges and prosecutors of the power to bar-
gain over the length of terms and would have hobbled the plea-
bargaining regime.”86 This mode of indeterminacy, in which a 
parole board has the power to adjust the length of the prison 
term, however, is not the only form of the indeterminate sen-
tence. 
A sentencing system is indeterminate to the extent that 
judgments about punishment are forward-looking in nature.87 A 
system is indeterminate, for example, if the length and nature of 
the penalty for a crime can be adjusted on the basis of prospec-
tive (and renewable) “assessments of the rehabilitative progress 
of the offender and the danger posed to the public by his or her 
presence in the community.”88 The identity of the party empow-
ered to make these assessments—whether it is the parole board 
or some other body—does not affect whether or not the sentence 
is indeterminate. Indeterminacy rests on whether the penalty 
for a crime can be adjusted based on events that occur in the 
future, not on the identity of the party who is designated to make 
those adjustments. 
Different models of testing have enabled prosecutors and 
judges to claim for themselves the powers inherent in the inde-
terminate sentence. Under these models, a parole board does not 
decide when a defendant has become sufficiently rehabilitated to 
merit the end of his or her punishment. Instead, prosecutors and 
 
 85. Id. at 860. 
 86. Id.  
 87. U.N. DEP’T OF SOC. AFFAIRS, THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE 1, 4 
(1954); Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy 
Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 298 (1974). 
 88. Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Su-
pervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 961, 963–96 (2013) (tracing the history 
and theory of indeterminate sentencing). 
  
1718 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1699 
 
judges retain direct control over the case while the defendant 
undergoes a Testing Period that will determine the length and 
character of his or her punishment. This type of indeterminate 
sentencing, far from diminishing the influence of prosecutors 
and judges, provides them with new lines of authority to affect 
case outcomes.  
The sentencing process created by these Testing Periods is 
indeterminate. The scale of the punishment is determined not 
primarily by the defendant’s past conduct (i.e., the offense of con-
viction), but by the defendant’s future conduct (i.e., the extent to 
which the defendant obeys the rules of the game going forward). 
The amount of the punishment, in other words, is not knowable 
at the time the defendant pleads guilty to a crime. Instead, the 
punishment will vary depending on how the defendant performs 
during the Testing Period, and, more specifically, on the extent 
to which the defendant is deemed compliant with the post-plea 
requirements laid out by the prosecutor or judge.89 
The first hints at the consequences of this change in orien-
tation are contained in a critical, but unexamined, aspect of the 
Jerusha Chase case.90 Scholars have cited this case as the first 
recorded example of probation, but no one has emphasized that 
the case also contains the first recorded example of a prosecutor 
and judge deciding that a defendant has failed the test of proba-
tion. The particulars of Chase’s violation reveal the kinds of au-
thority created by the shift in emphasis towards compliance with 
prospective rules. 
In the court’s May 1831 term, more than a year after Chase’s 
conviction for stealing a cloak went “on file,” the prosecutor 
charged Chase with a new count of larceny.91 The record reflects 
that Chase was indicted on this charge, “and upon her trial, was 
acquitted.”92 Following the acquittal on the larceny charge, how-
ever, the prosecutor moved for Chase to be sentenced on her 
 
 89. These dynamics reflect what Issa Kohler-Hausmann has termed the 
“managerial model” of criminal law adjudication. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, 
Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 614 (2014). 
 90. THACHER, supra note 26, at 267. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. The circumstances surrounding this “acquittal” are unclear. In a 
May 5, 1831 motion filed with Judge Thacher, Chase’s lawyer recounted that 
Chase had been in pretrial detention to “answer for a supposed larceny from 
Mrs. Catherine Dexter in Boston.” Petition of Jerusha Chase, Commonwealth 
v. Chase, (Bos. Mun. Ct. 1831) (on file with author). She remained in pretrial 
detention “until the Grand Jury had presented all their indictments at this 
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prior February 8, 1830, guilty plea—the one that had remained 
“on file”—on the basis that she had violated the rules of her Test-
ing Period by getting into trouble again.93 In granting this mo-
tion, the court determined that the prosecutor had retained full 
authority to move for Chase to be sentenced at any time, and 
that the acquittal on the larceny charge was not relevant.94 The 
court also emphasized that it had retained the power, upon mo-
tion, to sentence Chase on the old conviction.95 Exercising this 
power, the court sentenced Chase to five days solitary confine-
ment and six months of hard labor in the house of correction 
based on the guilty plea from the previous year.96  
In this way, probation had unleashed a system that would 
allow the prosecutor and judge to evade the jury twice over. The 
on-file mechanism helped persuade Chase to give up her jury 
trial rights in the first case. The breadth of the conditions gov-
erning the on-file Testing Period then enabled the prosecutor 
and judge to disregard the outcome of the jury system in the sec-
ond case.97  
II.  TESTING PERIODS IN CONNECTICUT   
I begin my study of how Testing Periods shape outcomes in 
criminal cases by focusing on Connecticut’s courts. I do so be-
cause a detailed analysis of the role and impact of Testing Peri-
ods must rise from a study of a particular place and in choosing 
that place, access is the leading consideration.98 Because I teach 
in Connecticut and practice in the superior court of New Ha-
ven—a famously busy courthouse in a representative town99—
the advantages of access situate my study in Connecticut.  
 
term, when she was brought from prison into this Court, & informed by the 
Clerk thereof that she was discharged from said supposed offence of larceny 
from Ms. Dexter.” Id. 
 93. Petition of Prosecutor, Commonwealth v. Chase, (Bos. Mun. Ct. 1831) 
(on file with author). 
 94. THACHER, supra note 26, at 267–68. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Commonwealth v. Chase, Docket Book, Municipal Court of Boston, July 
Term 1831 (on file with author); THACHER, supra note 26, at 267. 
 97. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 23, at 77–78 (“Although a jury acquitted 
[Chase] of the second crime, prosecutor Austin apparently believed strongly in 
her guilt. He concluded that she had violated her pledge to keep the peace and 
therefore moved that she be sentenced on the original indictment.”). 
 98. FEELEY, supra note 64, at xx. 
 99. Id. at xx–xxii (discussing a celebrated study of the New Haven court-
house); Jed Kolko, ‘Normal America’ Is Not a Small Town of White People, 
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Part II of this Article therefore seeks to illuminate the de-
vices that encourage defendants in Connecticut to plead guilty 
in exchange for a chance to avoid prison by passing a test. Con-
necticut utilizes both categories of Testing Periods that I discuss 
in Part I: the “on-file” model and the “sentenced” model. 
I first explore the dynamics of the “sentenced” model. In 
Connecticut, this sentence will take the form of either probation 
or a conditional discharge.100 As I will explain below, if a judge 
imposes either sentence, that judge must impose a suspended 
prison term at the same time.101 The suspended prison term is 
important because it hangs over the defendant’s head while the 
defendant is on probation or a conditional discharge.102 In Con-
necticut, the defendant is said to “owe” the length of the sus-
pended prison term during the Testing Period.103 The fact that 
the suspended prison term is framed in the language of debt is a 
marker of the defendant’s poor bargaining position in the event 
of an alleged rule violation. 
After analyzing the “sentenced” model, I explore various 
“on-file” arrangements in Connecticut that now operate between 
the guilty plea and the sentence. Under these arrangements, de-
fendants agree to plead guilty and then undergo a post-plea Test-
ing Period to try to earn a sentence of probation or (less com-
monly) the right to withdraw their guilty plea. These post-plea 
testing arrangements go by short-hand names in Connecticut, 
 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 28, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/normal 
-america-is-not-a-small-town-of-white-people (identifying New Haven as the 
metropolitan area that is most demographically representative of the U.S. pop-
ulation overall). 
 100. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-28(b) (West 2016). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 3, State v. Francis, No. N23N-CR17-
0179808-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Transcript of Francis] 
(recording a judge explaining in a guilty plea hearing: “I’m going to hold five 
years over your head” during a “two-year conditional discharge”); Transcript of 
Record at 7, State v. Nicholson, No. N23N-CR17-0174135-S (Conn. Super. Ct. 
July 20, 2017) (documenting a judge explaining in a guilty plea hearing that a 
sentence of probation would come with “up to seven years over your head”). 
 103. See, e.g., Brandy v. Comm’r of Corr., 873 A.2d 1061, 1062 n.3 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2005) (“On the [violation of probation] he owes five years . . . .”) (alter-
ation in original); State v. Grant, 874 A.2d 330, 334 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (not-
ing that the defendant “was serving a suspended sentence under which he owed 
three years and three months”); Transcript of Record at 1, State v. Langlais, No. 
NNH-CR18-0188802-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Transcript 
of Langlais] (reporting that the defendant is on a probation where “she owes 
five years on an underlying violation of protective order” conviction). 
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such as the “plea and withdraw” offer, pleading to a “cap,” drug 
court, and a conditional plea agreement. I take each of these ar-
rangements in turn. 
As I shall demonstrate, most of these “on-file” models are 
now doubly indeterminate, involving two distinct Testing Peri-
ods. Defendants must first pass a test during the on-file period 
to escape prison and, usually, earn a sentence of probation. After 
earning a sentence of probation, they must then abide by the 
rules of the sentenced period and pass a second test in order to 
avoid being sent to prison. 
A. SENTENCED MODEL TESTING PERIODS 
1. Using Suspended Sentences to Sort People for Prison 
Sentenced model Testing Periods in Connecticut depend on 
the use of suspended prison sentences. The suspended prison 
sentence comes in two forms in Connecticut, depending on 
whether the prison term is fully suspended or partially sus-
pended. For a fully suspended sentence, the judge takes three 
steps: he or she imposes a definite prison term (measured in 
days, months, or years), fully suspends that prison term, and or-
ders a period of probation or a conditional discharge.104 For a 
partially suspended sentence, the judge similarly imposes a def-
inite prison term, but only partially suspends that term, and 
then adds the period of probation or conditional discharge.105 In 
this latter option, the defendant serves part of the prison term 
upfront and the unserved portion of the term continues to dangle 
over the defendant’s head during the Testing Period.  
This Article focuses primarily on the inducement provided 
by the fully suspended sentence. The fully suspended sentence 
accounts for more than seventy-five percent of all of the sus-
pended sentences imposed in Connecticut.106 It is a leading in-
ducement in plea bargaining. 
In deciding to suspend the sentence, the judge must choose 
between two kinds of Testing Periods: probation or a conditional 
discharge. The key difference is that a conditional discharge does 
 
 104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-28(b) (West 2015). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Letter from the State of Connecticut, Judicial Branch, Court Support 
Servs. Div., Response to Data/Policy Questions (Apr. 7, 2017) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Response to Data/Policy Questions]. 
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not involve the supervision of a probation officer.107 The absence 
of a probation officer means there is no specially designated per-
son outside the courthouse charged with: (1) the task of monitor-
ing the defendant for compliance with the rules imposed, or (2) 
the authority to widen the net of control that a defendant must 
navigate. But a conditional discharge nonetheless sets up a Test-
ing Period because the defendant is required to follow conditions 
with the threat of prison hanging overhead.108  
The size of Connecticut’s probation and conditional dis-
charge population is several times larger than its prison popula-
tion,109 underscoring the importance of understanding the Test-
ing Periods that these systems create. The sentenced probation 
population alone exceeds the sentenced prison population by a 
measure of over three hundred percent.110 At the same time, 
however, mass incarceration and suspended prison terms are 
tightly linked in Connecticut, because violations of probation 
and conditional charge are a leading cause of incarceration in 
the state.111 In 2015, for example, roughly thirteen percent of 
Connecticut’s inmate population was in prison for a violation of 
probation or conditional discharge.112 The next most prevalent 
 
 107. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-29(b). 
 108. See, e.g., Ebron v. Comm’r of Corr., 992 A.2d 1200, 1207 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2010) (noting that a prosecutor “believed that because the petitioner owed six 
years on the conditional discharge, that was the appropriate starting point for 
an acceptable plea agreement”). 
 109. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 251149, PRISONERS IN 2016, at 6 (Caitlin Scoville & Jill Thomas 
eds., 2018); STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, COURT SUPPORT SERVS. DIV., 
ADULT PROBATION – QUARTERLY CASELOAD SNAPSHOT (2017) [hereinafter 
ADULT PROBATION], https://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/probation/ 
AdultProbation_040117.pdf. 
 110. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY & PLANNING DIV., CONN. OFFICE OF POL-
ICY & MGMT., MONTHLY INDICATORS REPORT 2 chart 2 (Dec. 2018) (reporting a 




 111. IVAN KUZYK & MIKE LAWLOR, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY & PLANNING 
DIV., CONN. OFFICE OF POLICY & MGMT., RECIDIVISM IN CT, 2008 RELEASES 6 
(2015). 
 112. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY & PLANNING DIV., CONN. OFFICE OF POLICY 
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offense was the sale of drugs, which accounted for less than half 
as many people in prison.113  
2. The Inducement of the Fully Suspended Sentence 
In this Section, I focus on the dynamics surrounding an 
agreement to plead guilty in exchange for a fully suspended sen-
tence. The offer of a fully suspended sentence is particularly at-
tractive to defendants because of the interplay of a number of 
“psychological pitfalls.”114 These pitfalls have been explored ex-
tensively in the literature on plea bargaining, but not in the con-
text of Testing Periods. 
In a fully suspended sentence, a defendant pleads guilty to 
a suspended time arrangement in order to avoid the immediate 
prospect of going to prison. In the negotiations leading up to the 
plea, the prosecutor secures a promise that the defendant will 
plead guilty to this or that charge. In return, the defendant se-
cures a promise that he or she will not be sent to prison as a 
consequence of the plea, without some other triggering event.  
Fully suspended plea offers are so common in Connecticut 
that they have their own shorthand lingo, instantly recognizable 
to insiders in the courthouse.115 A defendant might be offered a 
4-0-2, for example, in exchange for a plea to a certain crime. An 
insider to the system knows that this offer represents a fully sus-
pended sentence, because the defendant has the opportunity to 
serve zero days of the four-year term if he or she survives a two-
year Testing Period. Under a 4-0-2, the court imposes a four-year 
prison term but this term remains fully suspended as long as the 
defendant follows the rules of the court for two years. 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2496 (2004). 
 115. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 1–2, State v. Irizarry, No. N23N-CR18-
0187517S (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Transcript of Irizarry] 
(documenting statements in plea canvass, with the judge and prosecutor each 
noting that the defendant was pleading guilty to two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance for “1-0-2 on each”); Transcript of Record at 2, State v. 
Bastek, No. N23N-CR18-0182989-S (Conn. Super. Ct. June 27, 2018) [hereinaf-
ter Transcript of Bastek] (recording the court explaining that the sentence being 
imposed under the plea agreement was “[o]ne, zero, two CD on the interfering. 
One, zero, two CD on the criminal trespass. Consecutive. Total effective, two, 
zero, two CD”); Transcript of Record at 1, State v. McGibony, No. N23N-CR17-
0176555-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2018) (detailing a defense attorney ex-
plaining that the current offer from the state involved “a total effective sentence 
of four, zero, two and probation” on stacked misdemeanors). 
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By agreeing to the suspended time framework on the day of 
the plea—in order to avoid the immediate possibility of going to 
prison—defendants place themselves in a position of great vul-
nerability going forward. That period of vulnerability lasts as 
long as the Testing Period that the court orders as part of the 
deal. The parameters of the test itself depend on the nature of 
the conditions imposed, as any violation of a condition can be 
used to justify imposition of the suspended prison term.116 
Broad conditions expand the universe of potential rule vio-
lations, escalating the indeterminacy of the system. For a sen-
tence of conditional discharge, as reflected in the table below, 
there are only two default rules (the starred rules), although 
judges have the power to supplement these rules on a case-by-
case basis.117 But a sentence of probation comes with a host of 
pre-printed rules, which put the defendant under the direct con-
trol of a probation officer.118 These rules make clear, for example, 
that probation officers have extensive search powers, beyond 
those that normally apply in the criminal justice system.119 To 
invoke these powers, the probation officer need only have rea-
sonable suspicion that the person is violating a condition of pro-
bation (such as leaving the state or failing to report), rather than 




 116. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-32 (West 2017). 
 117. STATE OF CONN. SUPERIOR COURT, JD-CR-17, ORDER OF CONDITIONAL 
DISCHARGE (revised Oct. 2011); see also Transcript of Record at 5, State v. 
Fincher, Nos. N23N-CR18-0187298S & N23N-CR18-0186715S (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 4, 2018) (showing the judge accepting a guilty plea on an assault in the 
third degree charge and sentencing the defendant to be “committed to the cus-
tody of the Commissioner of Corrections for one year, fully suspended, two year’s 
conditional discharge. Conditions being no new arrests and you are not to con-
tact this individual, the victim”); Transcript of Irizarry, supra note 115, at 7 
(documenting the court noting that the defendant received a “total effective sen-
tence of two years, fully suspended, two years conditional discharge. Conditions 
being no new arrest”); Transcript of Record at 9, State v. Francis, No. N23N-
CR17-0179808-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2018) (recording the judge imposing 
a sentence of “five, zero, two CD” with conditions of “[n]o new crimes and stay 
away from that particular location”). 
 118. STATE OF CONN. SUPERIOR COURT, COURT SUPPORT SERVICES DIVISION 
– ADULT PROBATION, JD-App-110, CONDITIONS OF PROBATION (revised July 
2011) [hereinafter CONDITIONS OF PROBATION]. 
 119. Id. (“Submit to a search of your person, possessions, vehicle or residence 
when the Probation Officer has a reasonable suspicion to do so.”). 
 120. See State v. Moore, 963 A.2d 1019, 1023 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). 
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Key Standard Conditions of a Sentence of Probation in Connecticut 
 Do not violate any federal or state law.* 
 Provide a DNA sample (in felony cases).* 
 Report as the PO tells you. 
 Keep the PO informed of where you are.  
 Allow the PO to visit you as he or she requires. 
 Do not leave the state without the PO’s permission. 
 Submit to any medical or psychological examination, urinalysis,  
alcohol and/or drug testing, and/or counseling sessions required by the 
Court or the PO. 
 Submit to a search of your person, possessions, vehicle, or residence if 
the PO has reasonable suspicion for the search. 
 
The default rules apply automatically in every case of pro-
bation, but they are not the only rules that apply. The form 
leaves a space that invites the court to fashion special conditions 
for each defendant.121 The court can require the defendant to 
abide by any condition “reasonably related to the defendant’s re-
habilitation.”122 The most commonly imposed special conditions 
of probation, which focus heavily on substance abuse, are noted 
in the table below.123 
 
Connecticut Sentence of Probation – 2016 
Most Commonly Imposed Special Conditions (In Order of Frequency) 
1. Substance Abuse  
Treatment 
2. Substance Abuse  
Evaluation 
3. Community Service 
4. Restitution Payments 
5. No Operating Under  
Suspended License 
6. No Contact with  
Designated Person(s) 
7. Drug Urinalysis 
8. Stay Away from Designated 
Place(s) 
9. Mental Health Treatment 
10. No Possessing Weapon, 
Beeper, and/or Cell 
11. Mental Health Evaluation 
12. Counseling (other than 
mental health) 
13. Seek Employment 
14. Ignition Interlock Device 
15. Alcohol Treatment 
16. Alcohol Evaluation 
 
 
 121. CONDITIONS OF PROBATION, supra note 118. 
 122. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a) (West 2017). 
 123. Response to Data/Policy Questions, supra note 106, at 2. 
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The pre-printed form also makes clear that the probation of-
fice can itself augment the broadly-worded discretion that the 
standard rules grant a probation officer over a defendant.124 The 
form notes that probation “may require you to follow any or all 
conditions which the court could have imposed which are not in-
consistent with any condition actually imposed by the court. 
These conditions may include anything reasonably related to 
your rehabilitation.”125  
A number of psychological factors combine to encourage de-
fendants to accept broad (and expandable) conditions in ex-
change for the chance to avoid prison. Stephanos Bibas has ex-
plained, for example, how overconfidence bias, the discounting 
of future costs, loss aversion, and framing can all affect decision-
making in plea bargaining.126 Overconfidence can be a particu-
larly significant factor for defendants evaluating how they might 
succeed at a difficult task, such as making it through the Testing 
Period without a violation.127 Bibas notes that overconfidence is 
“exceptionally strong when people have some control: they are 
overly optimistic about how well they can exercise that control 
to avoid bad outcomes.”128 Defendants are also prone to discount 
future costs, privileging a day of freedom today more than a day 
of freedom in the future.129 This focus on securing freedom today 
leads defendants to discount the stakes involved in pleading 
guilty under a suspended time arrangement, which leaves the 
prospect of prison seemingly far off in the future. 
Loss aversion is another powerful force that pushes people 
toward outcomes that preclude the immediate prospect of prison. 
Bibas has explained how “avoiding loss seems to matter even 
more to people than avoiding risk”—“many would rather take 
big gambles than accede to losses.”130 The prospect of moving 
from freedom to incarceration represents one of the biggest 
losses imaginable. Deals built around a fully suspended sentence 
play into defendants’ determination to avoid this kind of loss, 
encouraging people to gamble with their ability to stay out of 
 
 124. CONDITIONS OF PROBATION, supra note 118. 
 125. Id.; see also State v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567, 574 (Conn. 2004) (noting 
probationer must “accept” that conditions can be enlarged in the future). 
 126. Bibas, supra note 114, at 2501–15. 
 127. Id. at 2501. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 2504. 
 130. Id. at 2508. 
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trouble in the future in exchange for the certainty of avoiding 
prison today.  
Framing is also a significant factor in how these deals are 
presented to defendants. Probation and conditional discharges 
are packaged as gains for defendants relative to the possibility 
of prison. This positive framing encourages defendants to be 
risk-adverse about losing the opportunities that probation or a 
conditional discharge represent.131 Indeed, these suspended time 
arrangements are officially marketed as a way to avoid punish-
ment. 
As in other states, courts in Connecticut are explicit in their 
categorization of probation as a means of escaping punish-
ment.132 This framing first appeared in a 1914 Connecticut Su-
preme Court case: 
[Probation] is not ordered for the purpose of punishment for the wrong 
for which there has been a conviction or for general wrongdoing. Its 
aim is reformatory and not punitive. It is to bring one who has fallen 
into evil ways under oversight and influences which may lead him to a 
better living. The end sought is the good of the individual wrongdoer, 
and not his punishment.133  
Over the years, the Connecticut Supreme Court has contin-
ued to emphasize that probation is not punishment, but a way 
“to provide a period of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of 
a penitent offender.”134 Defendants are more likely to agree to an 
option framed in this manner, even if it requires an upfront 
guilty plea and comes with a broad set of prospective rules.  
3. The Dynamics of Violation, Revocation, and Owing Time 
If a defendant is accused of violating a rule during a Testing 
Period and formal revocation proceedings are initiated, the same 
legal framework applies to an alleged violation of probation and 
of a conditional discharge.135 This framework is deeply disadvan-
tageous to the defendant. 
The key to understanding how much leverage the defendant 
has lost by agreeing to a suspended-time arrangement lies in ap-
 
 131. Id. at 2512 (emphasizing “[o]ptions that are packaged as gains” induce 
risk aversion; “when the very same choices are packaged as losses” they “induce 
risk taking because of loss aversion”). 
 132. Belden v. Hugo, 91 A. 369, 370 (Conn. 1914). 
 133. Id. 
 134. State v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567, 574 (Conn. 2004). 
 135. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-32(a) (West 2013). 
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preciating the interplay between three factors: (1) the low adju-
dicative standards that apply to revocation proceedings; (2) the 
framework that the defendant already “owes” prison time; and 
(3) the broad range of conduct that can justify a violation. 
In order to justify revoking probation or a conditional dis-
charge, the state need only prove that the defendant violated one 
of the conditions of the Testing Period by a fair preponderance of 
the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.136 This standard 
applies equally to the adjudication of technical violations and 
criminal violations. Judges must be satisfied by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition, thereby 
“abus[ing] the opportunity given him to avoid incarceration.”137 
The language of debt that suffuses these cases is perhaps 
even more prejudicial to a defendant than the low adjudicative 
standards that apply to a violation. In the colloquial language 
that pervades the courthouse, the defendant “owes” the sus-
pended time that he or she agreed to at the time of the plea on 
the underlying crime.138 Thus, any sentence that the defendant 
bargains for short of the time already “owed,” is presented as an 
act of favorable discretion by the prosecutor or judge.  
Generally speaking, the defendant did not have much nego-
tiating power at the time of the plea over the length of the sus-
pended sentence (i.e. the amount of time that might be “owed” in 
the future). At the time of the plea, the focus of the defense was 
on avoiding the immediate prospect of prison. In achieving that 
goal, and in buying into the framework that the defendant would 
satisfy whatever terms the court set during the Testing Period 
for the privilege of avoiding incarceration, the defense had little 
 
 136. Id. § 53a-32(d). 
 137. Payne v. Robinson, 523 A.2d 917, 921 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (quoting 
Roberson v. Connecticut, 501 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
 138. Over the course of one afternoon in the New Haven courthouse, for ex-
ample, the framing of defendants “owing” time while on probation or a condi-
tional discharge was invoked repeatedly in cases. See, e.g., Transcript of Lang-
lais, supra note 103, at 1 (noting that the defendant is on a probation “where 
she owes five years on an underlying violation of protective order” conviction); 
Transcript of Record at 2, State v. Mendoza, No. NNH-CR18-0188779-S (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2018) (indicating that the defendant “is on a CD” for an 
assault third conviction and “he does owe a year” on the conditional discharge); 
Transcript of Record at 2, State v. Sandillo, No. N23N-CR17-0179662-S (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2018) (detailing a court official noting that the defendant 
“does owe two years” on a violation of probation charge out of a neighboring 
court and “on our file, she does owe two years on an underlying larceny” charge). 
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room to quibble with the terms of the opportunity that the de-
fendant received.  
Once a violation is alleged, however, the abstract length of 
the suspended prison term takes on great significance. It now 
marks the depth of the hole that the defendant is in: a hole that 
the defendant has little (to no) independent leverage to escape. 
A central dynamic of being on probation is that many viola-
tion proceedings involve easy-to-prove conduct. Many conditions, 
for example, require a defendant to take a series of concrete and 
affirmative steps. Typical obligations include attending a weekly 
treatment session;139 reporting to the probation office on a cer-
tain day at a certain time;140 calling into a daily hotline as part 
of a drug testing program;141 and/or testing negative for drugs.142 
Any failure to meet these kinds of affirmative obligations pro-
vides a basis for a violation for which there is, generally speak-
ing, no defense.143 The most common technical violations that 









 139. PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS. OFFICE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
OVERVIEW OF PROBATION & SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS 42, 47 (2016) 
[hereinafter OVERVIEW]. 
 140. Id. at 16. 
 141. Id. at 42, 46; see also, e.g., Probation Drug Testing, U.S. DRUG TEST 
CENTERS, https://www.usdrugtestcenters.com/probation-drug-testing.html 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 142. OVERVIEW, supra note 139, at 42. 
 143. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 769 A.2d 698, 702, 708 (Conn. 2001) (upholding 
an eight year prison sentence for a probationer who was late for two appoint-
ments); State v. Workman, 944 A.2d 432, 434–35, 437 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) 
(upholding a two year prison sentence for a homeless probationer who failed to 
report and keep the probation office updated as to his whereabouts); Transcript 
of Record at 1–3, State v. Pintek, No. A22M-CR150088955S (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 10, 2018) (documenting a defense attorney reporting that his client, whom 
the attorney had met just that day, would accept the state’s offer and admit to 
violations of probation for missing treatment appointments and failing to pay 
restitution and receive forty-five days in jail followed by twenty-one months of 
probation). 
 144. Response to Data/Policy Questions, supra note 106, at 5. 
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Connecticut Probation – 2016 
Most Common Technical Violations Leading to Incarceration  
(In Order of Frequency) 
 
1. Failing to submit to any medical/psychiatric/substance abuse 
evaluation/treatment/urinalysis as required. 
2. Absconding from supervision (failing to report to PO). 
3. Failing to report as PO directs or failing to give immediate notice 
if arrested. 
4. Failing to abide by requirements of substance abuse treatment. 
5. Failing to keep PO informed of whereabouts or failing to give im-
mediate notice of change. 
6. Failing to meet restitution obligations. 
7. No contact with designated persons. 
 
Disputing one’s conduct with respect to these kinds of re-
quirements, moreover, is not only difficult; it can make it seem 
that one is not accepting the rehabilitative framework. Given the 
power dynamics at play, it might be counterproductive for a de-
fendant to argue that he or she made it to a probation appoint-
ment on time, for example, or did not in fact use drugs. As Fran-
cis Allen has observed, “assumptions of benevolent purpose in 
penal regimes with strong rehabilitative bents” can have a dis-
torting influence: “The willingness of the accused to assert ad-
versary positions against the state may be taken as the strongest 
evidence of the accused’s need for rehabilitation.”145 
Another consequence of having agreed to a suspended sen-
tence is that new criminal charges are treated differently. A low-
level charge, which might have been ignored if it required an ac-
tual criminal proceeding, can be dealt with more severely if the 
person is in a Testing Period. Even the smallest new case is 
harder to let go when the proof standards are so low, the person 
already “owes” the time, and the person is explicitly being tested.  
Moreover, as in the Jerusha Chase case, an acquittal on a 
new criminal charge provides no protection to defendants in 
Testing Periods. The appellate courts have stressed that “[i]t is 
 
 145. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 48 
(1981); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 64, at 80 (noting that in indeterminate 
sentencing systems, protest from prisoners “only made . . . reform seem all the 
more desirable: if prisoners did not like the medicine, it must be especially good 
for them”). 
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well settled that even when the defendant is acquitted of the un-
derlying crime leading to the probation revocation proceeding, 
probation may still be revoked.”146 
The defendant’s leverage in any new criminal case is also 
weakened by the practice of incorporating previously uncharged 
technical violations into the violation petition. Typically, a pro-
bation officer has been keeping track of any and all previous in-
stances of noncompliance, even if these failings were not enough 
by themselves to spur the probation officer to initiate violation 
proceedings. But once the probation officer decides to file a vio-
lation petition, the officer will generally include every other fail-
ure to comply with the rules during the Testing Period. Thus, a 
petition might allege that the defendant was arrested—perhaps 
for shoplifting or selling marijuana—and also include a list of 
every time the defendant missed a treatment appointment over 
the last year, even though the defendant did make most of his or 
her treatment appointments. Because a single missed appoint-
ment is both easy to prove and sufficient to sustain the violation 
petition, any documented act of noncompliance in the past di-
minishes the leverage the defendant has in fighting his or her 
new criminal violation. 
This diminished leverage works against the defendant both 
in fighting the new substantive criminal charge and in fighting 
the violation petition. If the defendant owes four years in any 
event, the easiest course for the prosecutor to pursue is to deal 
with the new criminal case in the context of the violation pro-
ceedings. If the state thinks that the new case merits eighteen 
months in prison (for a person with the defendant’s criminal his-
tory and probationary status), the defendant has little option but 
to go along. At best, the defendant might hope to convince the 
prosecutor that a sentence below eighteen months is appropri-
ate. But fighting the new criminal case in a violation proceeding 
is very difficult because of the low burden of proof and the fact 
that the state can also rely on an easy-to-prove technical viola-
tion to seek the same result. The state can get its eighteen-
month prison sentence without needing to rely on a criminal 
charge to get it. 
The defendant’s leverage is further undercut by the fact that 
the state does not necessarily need to prove that a violation was 
 
 146. State v. Durant, 892 A.2d 302, 307 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). 
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willful.147 The Supreme Court of Connecticut, for example, has 
held that willfulness is not an element of a probation violation.148 
To sustain a violation, “the state needs only to establish that the 
probationer know of the condition and engaged in conduct that 
violated the condition.”149 In one case, for example, the court rea-
soned that a probationer who did not attend meetings required 
by his probation officer, because those meetings conflicted with 
his job, had violated the conditions of his probation.150 “The 
choice to perform his job rather than to attend the scheduled 
meetings simply was not the defendant’s to make.”151 
The requirements imposed on the defendant, moreover, may 
not be spelled out in detail before the defendant pleads guilty—
or even elaborated on the record at the time of the plea. The Con-
necticut Supreme Court has held that a judge need not lay out 
the full parameters of a probation condition at the time of the 
plea in order for a violation of that condition to be upheld.152 In 
one case, for example, the trial court sentenced a defendant to 
twelve years in prison, fully suspended, with five years of proba-
tion (or a 12-0-5).153 In exchange for this suspended sentence, the 
defendant entered an Alford plea to a charge of sexual assault in 
the third degree and a charge of risk of injury to a child.154 Be-
cause the defendant entered his plea through the Alford doc-
trine, he was “not required to admit his guilt” as part of the 
deal.155 One of the conditions of the defendant’s probation, how-
ever, was that “he attend “[s]ex offender treatment as deemed 
 
 147. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 n.9 (1983) (“We do not 
suggest that, in other contexts [i.e., outside the failure to pay a fine], the proba-
tioner’s lack of fault in violating a term of probation would necessarily prevent 
a court from revoking probation.”). 
 148. State v. Hill, 773 A.2d 931, 937 (Conn. 2001) (discussing Bearden as 
limited to fines and emphasizing that the legislature did not make willfulness 
an element of a probation violation and perceiving “no public policy that would 
be served by such a requirement”). 
 149. Id. at 940. 
 150. Id. at 942. 
 151. Id.  
 152. State v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567, 587 (Conn. 2004). 
 153. Id. at 571–73. 
 154. Id. at 573. 
 155. Id. at 588 (citation omitted) (noting that the trial court had explained 
the Alford doctrine in the following terms: “And you plead guilty under the Al-
ford doctrine. That means you plead guilty but you don’t agree necessarily with 
everything that the state claims that you did or what they claim they could 
prove at trial. But you would rather plead guilty rather than run the risk of 
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appropriate by the office of probation.”156 Although the defend-
ant did enroll in the mandated treatment, it turned out that one 
of the rules of the treatment program was that he admit guilt to 
the underlying charges.157 Because the defendant refused to ad-
mit guilt, he was discharged from the treatment program and 
his probation was revoked.158 In upholding the revocation sen-
tence, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the trial court 
had fulfilled its obligation by telling the defendant to attend the 
treatment specified by probation.159 The court reasoned that “it 
was not incumbent upon the trial court also to list all the poten-
tial conduct that could result in a discharge from [the treatment] 
program.”160 Moreover, because the department of probation was 
“free to modify the terms of the defendant’s probation at any 
time,” the court considered it “unrealistic to expect the [judge] to 
canvass a defendant regarding the conduct necessary to comply 
with those terms.”161 The violation, therefore, was used to justify 
the imposition of the twelve-year prison sentence, even though 
the conduct at issue—admitting the charge—explicitly was not 
part of the “deal” to which the defendant agreed.162  
 
having another trial.”). For other examples of how courts explain the Alford doc-
trine, see Transcript of Record at 2, State v. Bland, No. N23N-CR18-0187034-S 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2018) (“Your counsel’s indicating you’re entering this 
plea under what’s called the Alford doctrine. What that tells the Court is you 
agree with some of [the prosecutor’s] facts but not all of them, nevertheless you 
don’t want to go to trial and possibly face a stiffer penalty so you’re accepting 
this plea, but I’m still finding you guilty of these two charges.”); Transcript of 
Francis, supra note 102, at 8 (“You pled under the Alford doctrine on the pos-
session charge. When you do that, you’re saying you don’t agree with the facts, 
but you’re willing to plead guilty because you know that there’s evidence against 
you on other files and you don’t want to take a chance and go to trial on the 
likelihood you’ll lose on something and get a worse penalty.”). 
 156. Faraday, 842 A.2d at 573. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 587. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 588–89. 
 162. The other probation violation upheld in Faraday also raised questions 
about the scope of the conditions imposed. The defendant was ordered not to 
have unsupervised contact with children under sixteen, but the court made an 
exception for contact with his wife and her child, unless the probation depart-
ment decided it was inappropriate. Connecticut’s Appellate Court initially held 
that some affirmative “wrongdoing” was required before the defendant could be 
revoked on the basis of this condition, but the Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 
577–82.  
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B. ON-FILE MODEL TESTING PERIODS 
1. Framework of Supercharged Indeterminacy 
Other arrangements have developed around routine plea 
bargaining in Connecticut that require defendants to undergo 
more concentrated Testing Periods. The procedures behind these 
Testing Periods follow the “on-file” model because they operate 
between the guilty plea and the sentencing hearing. This Section 
explores four mechanisms that I identify as creating “on-file” 
Testing Periods: plea and withdraw, caps, drug court, and 
Garvin agreements.  
With the exception of drug courts, none of these “on-file” 
mechanisms appears on Connecticut’s statute books. They are 
therefore much less visible than a sentence of probation or condi-
tional discharge. Except for the drug courts, moreover, the judi-
cial branch does not keep statistics about how often these mech-
anisms are used—or what outcomes have resulted from their use 
over time.163 But they are accepted and standardized features of 
everyday practice in the courthouse. 
These “on-file” mechanisms create what I call a period of su-
percharged indeterminacy. The rules are announced in court at 
the time of the guilty plea, and the stakes are high. The defend-
ant must abide by the rules or be prepared to suffer the conse-
quences at sentencing. Significantly, because “on-file” Testing 
Periods operate in a hazy period between guilty plea and sen-
tencing, courts do not always apply even the meagre protections 
that are required for the “sentenced” model. In certain circum-
stances, for example, a Connecticut trial court need only find a 
rule violation by a “minimum indicia of reliability.”164 
2. Plea and Withdraw 
One mechanism for creating a period of supercharged inde-
terminacy involves having the defendant plead guilty to a crime 
with the opportunity to later withdraw or change the plea.165 
 
 163. See Interview with Data Specialist, Conn. Judicial Branch (Mar. 2017). 
 164. See infra Part II.B.5. 
 165. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 822 A.2d 948 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (outlining 
the legal structure of a plea and withdraw offer); Transcript of Record at 2–3, 
State v. Kendrick, No. N23N-CR17-0175113-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2017) 
(reflecting that the defendant pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors with the un-
derstanding that if he completed a treatment program, he could withdraw the 
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This mechanism requires the agreement of the prosecutor in 
Connecticut, as a judge does not have the authority to force a 
prosecutor to decline to pursue (or “come off”) any particular 
charge. 
A plea and withdraw offer can be built around any kind of 
Testing Period endorsed by the prosecutor, such as one that re-
quires a defendant to test negative for drugs going forward. In a 
case involving a defendant with a substance abuse problem, for 
example, the prosecutor might give the defendant a chance to 
avoid both a conviction and a prison sentence by proposing a plea 
and withdraw arrangement. Under a typical scenario, the de-
fendant might agree to plead guilty to two misdemeanor charges 
upfront. He would then be allowed to try to maintain “clean” 
urines during a Testing Period. If he was successful in testing 
negative for drugs, he could withdraw the guilty pleas and the 
prosecutor would nolle (decline to prosecute) all of the charges. 
On the other hand, if the defendant had a positive urine test dur-
ing the Testing Period, then the convictions would stand, and he 
would receive a two-year fully-suspended prison sentence and 
one year of probation (a 2-0-1).166 The prosecutor might require 
the defendant to “accept or reject” the deal by a certain date. The 
structure of this offer would mean that the defendant would have 
to come to a quick decision on whether to gamble on his ability 
to stay “clean” during a Testing Period. 
A failed plea-and-withdraw deal can draw defendants into a 
world of sharply escalating penal consequences. For example, a 
prosecutor might want an indigent defendant to pay a small 
amount of restitution to resolve a larceny in the sixth degree 
misdemeanor charge, a low-level misdemeanor in Connecticut. 
At first, the prosecutor might give the defendant the opportunity 
to make the restitution payment by a certain date in return for 
a nolle of the charge. If the defendant cannot pay by this date, 
 
guilty pleas and the charges would be dismissed; however, if he failed to com-
plete the program, the guilty pleas would stand and the judge could sentence 
him to up to two years in prison); Transcript of Record at 1–2, State v. Martinez, 
No. N23N-CR15-0162186-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2016) (indicating that the 
defendant, who had no criminal record, would plead guilty to felony counts with 
the understanding that if he was successful in treatment, he would be allowed 
to withdraw the felony guilty pleas, re-plead to misdemeanors, and receive a 
fully suspended prison sentence; however, if he wasn’t compliant with treat-
ment, the felony convictions would stand and the court could “automatically” 
sentence him to “up to three years in prison”). 
 166. The example of this “plea and withdraw” arrangement is based on cases 
I have encountered in the Connecticut courts. 
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the prosecutor might offer a plea and withdraw arrangement. 
Under the terms of the arrangement, the defendant would enter 
a guilty plea to the larceny in the sixth degree charge, but she 
could withdraw this plea as long as she paid the restitution by a 
certain date. If she failed to pay by that date, she would receive 
a ninety-day prison sentence (the statutory maximum for lar-
ceny in the sixth degree), but this sentence would be fully sus-
pended during a year of probation. A defendant who failed to 
meet the payment deadline would receive the designated sen-
tence. Once she was on probation, she might continue to miss the 
payment deadlines and as a consequence, also fail to report to 
her probation officer. The probation officer could then initiate 
revocation proceedings against her on both grounds. Because the 
defendant did not succeed in the Testing Period, she would now 
“owe” the full statutory maximum prison sentence available on 
the original charge.167 
3. Cap 
A cap is a mechanism in Connecticut that allows defendants 
to try to earn a fully suspended sentence after they plead guilty 
to a crime. By agreeing to plead guilty under a cap arrangement, 
the defendant gets an opportunity to avoid any prison time for 
the crime to which he or she has just pleaded guilty.168 Contrary 
to the plea and withdraw arrangement, the defendant generally 
cannot withdraw the guilty plea even if he or she succeeds dur-
ing the Testing Period.169 
 
 167. The description of this sequence of events is based on my experience of 
cases in the Connecticut courts. For an example of escalating consequences in 
another context, see Transcript of Record at 1–9, State v. Duchnowsky, 
No. A22M-CR170094371S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2018) (showing that the 
prosecutor and judge initially agreed to let a defendant who was a victim of 
domestic violence enter a diversionary program that did not require a guilty 
plea; however, after the defendant missed three intake appointments, the agree-
ment changed to a six-month fully-suspended prison sentence and eighteen 
months of probation on an upfront misdemeanor guilty plea). 
 168. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 1, State v. Cobb, No. N23N-CR18-
0182469-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 25, 2018) (detailing plea agreement under a 
“five-year cap” in which prosecutor agreed to recommend a suspended sentence 
if the defendant did “well with his treatment”). 
 169. See, e.g., State v. Ramos, No. CR07237195, 2008 WL 5220934, *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2008) (noting that the defendant would receive a fully sus-
pended sentence—not the right to withdraw his guilty plea—if he succeeded in 
a drug treatment program pursuant to a cap arrangement). It is important to 
note that a negotiated arrangement can rely on a combination of procedural 
devices. In an arrangement that combines a cap with a plea-and-withdraw offer, 
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In essence, a cap sets a ceiling on the defendant’s exposure 
at sentencing should the defendant fail to abide by the conditions 
set by the prosecutor or the judge.170 For example, if the defend-
ant is charged with a count that has a ten-year statutory maxi-
mum, the prosecutor may allow the defendant to plead guilty to 
this count under a five-year cap arrangement. The deal would 
typically follow a set structure: (1) if the defendant abides by the 
rules of the Testing Period, the prosecutor will agree to recom-
mend a fully suspended sentence to the judge (accompanied by a 
period of probation or conditional discharge) or (2) if the defend-
ant fails to meet these requirements, the prosecutor will seek a 
prison sentence. 
The defendant would “be on” what is colloquially known as 
a cap and “a watch.”171 The Testing Period is typically a few 
months,172 and the stakes are high: If the judge decides that the 
defendant failed to meet any of the imposed requirements, the 
defendant is said to have “blown the cap.”173  
 
for example, the court would allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea 
(following a successful Testing Period) or would let the guilty plea stand and 
sentence the defendant under the cap (following an unsuccessful Testing Pe-
riod). See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 1–2, 5–6, State v. McGibony, No. N23N-
CR17-0176555-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2018) (reflecting an arrangement in 
which the defendant who had earlier pleaded guilty under a cap to a felony 
charge was allowed to withdraw the felony plea and plead guilty to “stacked 
misdemeanors” for a fully suspended sentence as a consequence of having suc-
ceeded in drug treatment). 
 170. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 1–2, State v. Wells, No. N23N-CR15-
0159926 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Transcript of Wells] (re-
flecting that the judge explained that the defendant would admit to a violation 
of a conditional discharge and “I’m gonna let you go to a program” with a “four 
year cap over your head” which means if you do not “follow the directives” of the 
program, “the Court can put you in jail for up to four years[;]” however, “if you 
go to this program and you don’t commit any new crimes and you’re successful, 
then you’re guaranteed to get a suspended sentence at the end of it”). 
 171. See, e.g., Transcript of Bastek, supra note 115, at 1 (noting at a sentence 
hearing that the defendant pleaded guilty at a prior date and “has been on a 
watch,” but because the defendant “has not offended during the period of time 
the defendant was on a watch,” defendant had earned a fully suspended two-
year prison sentence and a two-year conditional discharge). 
 172. See, e.g., Transcript of Wells, supra note 170, at 1 (recording the judge 
noting that on a cap guilty plea: “I normally do three months.”). 
 173. To have “blown the cap” is a colloquial expression I have often heard in 
the courts.  
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One brand of a cap deal provides defendants with what is 
known as a “right to argue” should they fail to meet the condi-
tions during the Testing Period.174 A right to argue means that 
the penalty for violating the conditions is not pre-determined as 
the amount of time specified in the cap.175 If the cap is five years, 
the defendant can bring forward mitigating evidence and try to 
convince the judge to impose less than five years in prison in the 
event of a violation.  
The case law demonstrates the magnitude of the stakes dur-
ing the Testing Period—even in a right to argue case, generally 
the most favorable cap arrangement for a defendant. In one typ-
ical case, for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to the pos-
session of narcotics under a cap deal of “seven years with a right 
to argue for less.”176 Following his guilty plea, the defendant was 
supposed to attend and follow the conditions of a drug treatment 
program, as well as “show up in court as required by the plea 
agreement.”177 As long as he fulfilled these conditions, the de-
fendant would earn a fully suspended sentence.178 The defend-
ant, who had been “dealing with substance abuse issues for his 
entire life,” did not meet the requirements of the deal: he failed 
to show up in court and did not comply with the conditions set 
by the drug program.179 As a consequence, the court held a sen-
tencing hearing, affording the defendant the chance to ask for 
less than seven years in prison.180 The court ultimately imposed 
five years in prison and two years of special parole (a form of 
judge-imposed post-incarceration supervision, overseen by the 
parole board).181  
The stakes are even higher in cases involving no right to ar-
gue, as the defendant essentially agrees to forfeit all future lev-
erage if there is a violation. If there is no right to argue, the de-
fendant is “agreeing” up front to the imposition of the full cap 
sentence for any violation of any term of the agreement. 
 
 174. See, e.g., State v. Leggett, No. H15NCR21263030, 2013 WL 4504805, at 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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In one such case, for example, the defendant received ten 
years in prison after he left a drug treatment program.182 The 
man had pleaded guilty to four crimes under a ten-year cap 
agreement.183 He pleaded guilty to stealing a snow blower from 
a residence, failing to appear in court, possessing a crack pipe, 
and interfering with the police officers who sought to serve a 
warrant on him.184 The trial court laid out the contours of the 
plea agreement on the record: 
  THE COURT: What’s going to happen is you’re going to plea [sic] 
to the charge that your lawyer has worked out with the State. And the 
condition then when they get a bed available for you at DAYTOP, I’m 
going to give you a promise to appear to go to DAYTOP with a cap of 
10 years over your head. I’m going to bring you back like every six 
weeks, or every two months. If you leave the program, get a dirty urine, 
or you pick up a new arrest, ten years in jail. Do well the first year, 
you’ll get 10 suspended and probation, condition: to complete the pro-
gram; do you understand that, sir? 
  THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
  THE COURT: Is that what you want to do? 
  THE DEFENDANT: Sure. 
  THE COURT: But if you drop the ball, it’s 10 years of your life.185  
This arrangement provided little flexibility to the defend-
ant. Succeeding required following the pre-set terms of the deal: 
remaining at the Daytop program in particular, rather than re-
maining in drug treatment more generally. As it turned out, the 
defendant left Daytop after about two months, because “he could 
not abide by the strict rules of the program.”186 After leaving 
Daytop, he voluntarily enrolled in a different drug treatment 
program, run by the Salvation Army.187 The court gave the de-
fendant one more chance to fulfill the agreement by returning to 
Daytop. The defendant left Daytop again, however, “because he 
could not comply with program rules.”188 After leaving Daytop, 
he returned to the Salvation Army program.189 The state moved 
 
 182. State v. Quattrucci, No. CR03187707, 2006 WL 618415, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2006). 
 183. Id. at *1–2. 
 184. Id. at *1. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at *2. 
 189. Id. 
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for sentencing on the grounds that the defendant had violated 
the terms of the cap plea deal.190 
In sentencing the defendant to the full ten years in prison, 
the judge expressed sympathy for the defendant’s struggles with 
addiction but stressed the importance of enforcing the deal that 
was struck.191 The judge sentenced the defendant to five years 
on the snow blower charge and a consecutive five years on the 
failure to appear charge.192 
The court’s opinion hints at just how big of a reach this deal 
was for the defendant. It notes that the defendant had unsuc-
cessfully attempted the Daytop program several years before.193 
Despite this history, the defendant agreed to sacrifice all future 
leverage should he fail at the same program again. Lured by the 
hope of a completely suspended sentence, the defendant (a per-
son suffering from a long-term addiction) agreed to enter Daytop 
with the specter of a ten-year prison term hanging over his 
head.194 The little background information revealed about the 
defendant indicates that it is no surprise that he lost that bet. 
A cap deal can lengthen the prison sentence that the defend-
ant would have faced absent such a deal. In one case, for exam-
ple, the state offered the defendant four-and-a-half years in 
prison to resolve a number of charges, including a drug posses-
sion count.195 The court suggested an alternative deal, one that 
doubled the defendant’s exposure through a nine-year cap, but 
also offered the possibility of the defendant avoiding prison alto-
gether.196 To take advantage of this deal, the defendant would 
have to plead guilty to the drug possession charge and three pro-
bation violations.197 Following the plea, the court would monitor 
the defendant for four months for compliance with three require-
ments: (1) “follow all of the A.I.C.’s rules [a court-mandated su-
pervision program], (2) not be arrested, (3) and not test positive 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (stressing that the judge could not allow the defendant to change the 
terms of the deal midstream or else “we lose all credibility and all of our integ-
rity”). 
 192. Id. at *1. 
 193. Id. at *2. 
 194. Id. at *1. 
 195. Black v. Warden, No. CV054000290S, 2006 WL 695669, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2016). 
 196. Id. at *2. 
 197. Id. 
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for illegal narcotics.”198 If the defendant “was successful after 
four months,” the court would place him back on a sentence of 
probation; “but if he was unsuccessful, the court would give him 
nine years to serve with no right to argue for less.”199  
The defendant in this case blew the cap when he tested pos-
itive for cocaine on one occasion, even though he then tested neg-
ative for cocaine the following week.200 The court received the 
results of both tests at the same time.201 It relied on the positive 
test to sentence the defendant to nine years in prison.202 
The conditions laid down in these cases are typical of those 
required through cap deals in Connecticut. The conditions regu-
larly relate to drug abstinence or the successful completion of a 
treatment program. The defendant is often told that he or she 
has to follow all of the rules of the program, whatever those rules 
might be.203 The defendant may also have to undergo drug and/or 
alcohol testing, with the expectation that these tests must come 
back negative.204  
4. Drug Court 
The drug court model in Connecticut presents another vari-
ation on the same formula: a supercharged Testing Period en-
forced through a cap. Drug courts are “available to offenders who 
could benefit from placement in a substance abuse treatment 
program.”205 The expressed vision is that the “court, courthouse 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at *3. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 6, State v. Torres, No. N23N-CR16-
0169471-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Transcript of Torres] 
(telling the defendant he must “comply with all the rules and regulations of th[e] 
treatment program”).  
 204. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 3–6, State v. Odom, No. N23N-CR18-
0184353-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2018) (indicating that defendant pleaded 
guilty to a violation of probation and a risk-of-injury-to-a-child charge under a 
six-year-cap plea deal; the prosecutor stated that under the deal, the defendant 
would attend two treatment programs and “if she successfully completes both 
of these she will receive a suspended sentence with probation[;]” and the judge 
added in two conditions during the plea colloquy: “I’m gonna order random 
urines just to make sure that there’s no substance abuse issues here” and “I 
believe in addition that there should be an order that you cooperate with DCF 
while the case is pending.”). 
 205. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-181b(a) (West 2016). 
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staff, treatment, and social service staff” will work together to 
monitor the defendant’s progress in treatment.206 Two jurisdic-
tions in Connecticut operate drug court dockets: New Haven and 
Danielson.207  
In order to be eligible for drug court, a defendant must agree 
to plead guilty under a cap plea deal, which creates an “on-file” 
Testing Period.208 Defendants who agree to this deal typically do 
so to avoid an immediate sentence of incarceration. The under-
standing is that by succeeding in drug court, the defendant “may 
get a better result in his or her case, such as getting a suspended 
sentence instead of having to go to jail.”209 
The drug court framework amplifies the intensity of the 
Testing Period in a number of ways. First, the cap exposure is 
typically higher than it would be if the defendant were not in 
drug court. Second, the Testing Period in drug court is generally 
twelve months, much longer than the standard period that ap-
plies to cap pleas.210 Third, the court can sanction the defendant 
along the way as an additional mechanism to try and force the 
defendant to comply with the program.211 Fourth, a set number 
 
 206. JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE STATE OF CONN., JDP-CR-137C, DRUG INTER-
VENTION PROGRAMS (2014), http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/CR137C.pdf. 
 207. CHRISTOPHER REINHART, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY, CONNECTICUT’S DRUG COURTS 1 (2016), http://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
2016/rpt/pdf/2016-R-0048.pdf. 
 208. See, e.g., State v. Olson, No. N23NCR0656513, 2008 WL 5481291 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 2008) (reflecting that the defendant pleaded guilty 
under a six-year cap as part of a drug court plea). 
 209. JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE STATE OF CONN., supra note 206; see also 
Transcript of Record at 5, State v. Langlois, No. W11D-CR16-0158726-S (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Transcript of Langlois] (indicating that the 
drug court defendant would receive a fully suspended sentence if successful in 
drug court or up to five to seven years in prison if unsuccessful); Transcript of 
Record at 5, State v. Knighton, No. W11D-CR16-0158977 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 
17, 2017) (recording that the defendant pleaded guilty in a drug court canvass 
to selling a small amount of heroin, and the judge explained that the defendant 
would receive a fully suspended sentence if successful in drug court or, if unsuc-
cessful, a prison sentence of between four and six years). 
 210. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 8–9, State v. Bojka, No. N23N-CR18-
0182387-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 2018) [hereinafter Transcript of Bojka] 
(showing the judge warning a drug court defendant who was entering guilty 
pleas under a six-year cap that the judge would monitor the defendant in treat-
ment for a year and under the plea agreement: “You’re saying, okay, if I violate 
any of the rules or I mess up in any way, I’m agreeing to a two-week sanction, 
jail sanction, two times. If it happens a third time then you could face the six 
years, okay, which is what the agreement is.”). 
 211. See, e.g., id. 
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of rule violations is supposed to trigger sentencing under the cap 
because the defendant has failed to graduate from drug court.212 
The rules of the Connecticut drug courts are very broad. The 
basic rules, which are put on the record during the guilty plea 
hearing, typically require the defendant to comply with treat-
ment, comply with program rules and regulations, render nega-
tive urines, and not get rearrested.213 The defendant has to ap-
pear before the judge regularly to allow the court to “track his or 
her behavior.”214  
The drug court’s sanctioning scheme heightens the defend-
ant’s vulnerability during the Testing Period. Drug courts set a 
two-week jail sanction for each positive drug test or any other 
rule violation.215 Under the formal structure, the defendant is 
permitted two sanctions before the court schedules a sentencing 
hearing.216 Thus, the framework provides that the court should 
abandon its treatment methodology after a third violation of the 
rules and proceed to sentence the defendant under the cap.217  
 
 212. See, e.g., Transcript of Langlois, supra note 209, at 7 (indicating that 
the judge warned the defendant who was entering the drug court docket: “Vio-
lations of any of the program rules may result in a strike. If you get three 
strikes, you’ll be terminated from the program.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Transcript of Bojka, supra note 210, at 10 (showing the judge 
explaining that the rules of drug court include having negative urines, not hav-
ing any new arrests, abiding by all the rules and regulations of the program 
(such as a prohibition on the use of cell phones), and participating in treatment); 
Transcript of Langlois, supra note 209, at 6–7 (indicating that during the one-
year drug court program, the defendant had to attend court on a regular basis; 
had to fully participate in all treatment and services provided; had to agree to 
unannounced home visits and warrantless searches of his person; had to sign 
any release of information as directed; had to submit to “any drug or alcohol test 
at any time” by any police officer or anyone else appointed by the state or the 
court; could not use illegal substances, prescription narcotics, or alcohol; and 
could not “eat anything that might induce a false positive in a urine test, includ-
ing poppy seeds”); Transcript of Record at 3, State v. Roberts, No. N23N-CR16-
0169782-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2017) (recording the fact that the judge 
gave the defendant one more chance to succeed in drug court by putting him on 
zero tolerance status and explaining: “You must comply with every rule of the 
program. If they tell you to go in and scrub the bathroom floor, you go in and 
scrub the bathroom floor. All right. They—if they tell you that you have to be on 
time for meetings or stay after or help—I don’t care what they tell you to do. At 
this point in time, do it.”). 
 214. REINHART, supra note 207, at 2. 
 215. See Transcript of Bojka, supra note 210, at 8–9 (explaining the penalty 
system within drug courts). 
 216. See, e.g., id. 
 217. For an example of the language of “owing” time in the drug court con-
text, see Transcript of Record at 1, State v. Turner, No. N23N-CR17-0177074-S 
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The possibility of avoiding jail altogether is the sizable car-
rot that induces defendants to enter drug court, although this 
bet does not pay off for many people. The New Haven and Dan-
ielson drug courts both have been operating since 2004, although 
their effectiveness has never been formally evaluated.218 In New 
Haven, the reported graduation rate (over a twelve-year period) 
was fifty-five percent.219 In Danielson, the comparable gradua-
tion rate was forty-nine percent.220 
The case law demonstrates that defendants may receive 
more time as a result of failing to graduate from drug court than 
if they had accepted a definite sentence at the time of the plea.221  
5. Garvin Agreements 
a. Parameters and Impact 
Judges in Connecticut have devised an important mecha-
nism—known as a Garvin agreement—to create an “on-file” 
Testing Period that is firmly under their own control. A Garvin 
agreement is a type of conditional plea agreement.222 Under the 
arrangement, when the judge accepts the defendant’s guilty plea 
(as negotiated with the prosecutor), the judge adds conditions 
 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2017) (showing the prosecutor explaining that a drug 
court defendant who pleaded guilty under a three-year cap and subsequently 
failed to complete the drug court’s outpatient program successfully “does owe 
the three-year cap”). 
 218. REINHART, supra note 207, at 2–3. 
 219. Id. at 3. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See, e.g., State v. White, Nos. CR0865595 & CR0883079, 2010 WL 
2109150, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010) (noting that the length of the 
defendant’s four-year prison sentence after failing in drug court was justified in 
part by her “insincere efforts to get treatment”); State v. Forant, Nos. 
CR06005116 & CR060233201, 2008 WL 4151316, at *1–2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 22, 2008) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the fifteen-year prison 
sentence he received after failing in drug court was disproportionate to the “less 
severe” sentences his co-defendants received; noting that the co-defendants had 
“accepted definite sentences,” while the defendant had “voluntarily agreed to 
have his case adjudicated in drug court with the hopes of avoiding jail alto-
gether”). 
 222. See State v. Stevens, 895 A.2d 771, 775 (Conn. 2006) (“A Garvin agree-
ment is a conditional plea agreement that has two possible binding outcomes, 
one that results from the defendant’s compliance with the conditions of the plea 
agreement and one that is triggered by his violation of a condition of the agree-
ment.” (quoting State v. Wheatland, 888 A.2d 1098, 1100 n.3 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2006))). 
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that the defendant must follow during the Testing Period.223 A 
defendant who satisfies these conditions receives the bargained-
for sentence.224 A defendant who does not satisfy these condi-
tions is no longer entitled to the benefit of the bargain with the 
prosecutor.225 Even though the benefit no longer applies, how-
ever, that defendant cannot withdraw the guilty plea.226 Unlike 
conditions attendant to a cap, which both judges and prosecutors 
can negotiate, judges maintain exclusive control over Garvin 
conditions.227 
Garvin agreements take their name from a 1997 Connecti-
cut case.228 The defendant pleaded guilty to a set of crimes that 
included a sexual assault and a conspiracy to commit robbery.229 
He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that specified 
that he would receive a total sentence of fifteen years, execution 
suspended after eight years in prison, followed by three years of 
probation.230 At the time of the guilty plea, the court let the de-
fendant know that if he failed to appear on the date set for the 
sentencing hearing, the court would no longer be bound by the 
sentence contained in the plea agreement.231  
The defendant in Garvin did not appear on the date set for 
the sentencing hearing, and he received an extra four years to 
serve in prison as a result.232 The Connecticut Supreme Court 
upheld the enhanced sentence by relying on contract principles 
and emphasizing that fulfillment of the condition had been 
“within the defendant’s control.”233 The court noted that the de-
fendant had received “consideration” for his guilty plea “in the 
form of the agreed upon sentence.”234 The fact that this consid-
eration later vanished, when the defendant received more than 
the agreed-upon sentence, was a consequence of the defendant’s 
own failings.235 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. State v. Garvin, 699 A.2d 921 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). 
 229. Id. at 922–23. 
 230. Id. at 923. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 924.  
 233. Id. at 929–30. 
 234. Id. at 929.  
 235. Id. at 930.  
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In the wake of the Garvin decision, courts have imposed a 
broad array of prospective conditions to create Garvin Testing 
Periods. These conditions include: making restitution pay-
ments,236 attending court-ordered treatment programs,237 pass-
ing drug tests,238 not making any contact with a victim,239 and 
not getting arrested with probable cause.240 Any failure to abide 
by these conditions during the pre-sentence Testing Period ex-
poses the defendant to a prison term above and beyond the bar-
gained-for sentence.241 
The strictness that can accompany a Garvin Testing Period 
is illustrated by a case that required a defendant to appear at 
his sentencing hearing on a specific date at 10 AM242 The defend-
ant was not present in the courtroom at 10 AM on the appointed 
day.243 His exact time of arrival was subject to dispute, but he 
“arrived no earlier than 10:55 [AM] and perhaps as late [as] 2:20 
[PM]”244 As a consequence of his late arrival, the defendant had 
to serve an extra two years in prison.245 
For some Garvin agreements, the bargained-for sentence is 
a fully-suspended sentence, creating many of the same dynamics 
that accompany pleas to a cap.246 The defendant will only earn 
 
 236. E.g., Fulton v. Comm’r of Corr., 12 A.3d 1058, 1061 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2011). 
 237. E.g., State v. Dzwonkowski, 94 A.3d 657, 661–62 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014); 
State v. Brown, 75 A.3d 713, 716 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013); State v. Rosado, 887 
A.2d 917, 918 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). 
 238. State v. Trotman, 791 A.2d 700, 702 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
 239. State v. Small, 826 A.2d 211, 213 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). 
 240. Id.; State v. Ramon, No. H12MCR140248936S, 2015 WL 9242051, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2015). 
 241. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 4–6, State v. Lamson, No. N23N-CR18-
0182063-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2018) (showing that the judge explained 
to the defendant that if the defendant failed at a drug treatment program but 
came back to court, the “most I’m going to give you is five, one, three,” but “if 
“you leave and you don’t come back, I will tune you up. . . . Up to ten years. You 
understand?”); Transcript of Record at 7–9, State v. Nicholson, No. N23N-CR17-
0174135-S (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2017) (indicating that the judge explained 
that if the defendant failed at a treatment requirement under a seven-year cap, 
“I can sentence you up to that seven years and you can’t complain,” but that if 
defendant failed to appear or got rearrested, the court could sentence him up to 
twelve years in prison for violating the court’s Garvin conditions). 
 242. Dawson v. Comm’r of Corr., 942 A.2d 519, 521 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 522–23. 
 245. Id. at 522. 
 246. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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the suspended sentence if he or she completes the treatment pro-
gram or passes drug screens during the Garvin Testing Pe-
riod.247 
One illustrative (and oft-cited) case, State v. Trotman, shows 
how the promise of fully suspended time is invoked in the Garvin 
context.248 Ms. Trotman pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine 
to a charge of possessing narcotics and admitted a violation of 
probation.249 Under the terms of the plea deal, the case was con-
tinued for four months after the guilty plea to allow Ms. Trotman 
time to enroll in a drug treatment program.250 In ratifying the 
deal, the judge imposed several Garvin conditions for the on-file 
Testing Period: she had to render “clean urines,” “cooperate” 
with the program, and not get re-arrested.251 If she satisfied 
these conditions, she would earn a four-year, fully-suspended 
sentence with three years of probation.252 If she failed to comply 
with the conditions, she was warned: “the court will sentence you 
to four years to serve. And your attorney does not retain the right 
to argue for anything less than that.”253 
Ultimately, the drug testing condition tripped up Ms. Trot-
man, converting her sentence from four years of suspended time 
 
 247. See, e.g., State v. Trotman, 791 A.2d 700, 702 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) 
(showing the judge granting the defendant a suspended sentence if she “submits 
to random urine samples for drug testing” through a treatment program). For a 
case example that combines many of the different procedural devices discussed 
so far, see Transcript of Torres, supra note 203, at 5–8, where a defendant 
pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to a felony count under a three-year 
cap agreement that specified that if the defendant succeeded in an inpatient 
and outpatient drug treatment program (including by complying with “all the 
rules and regulations” of the program), he would be allowed to withdraw the 
felony plea, re-plead to stacked misdemeanors, and receive a three-year fully 
suspended prison sentence with two years of probation; however, if he did not 
successfully complete the treatment program, the felony guilty plea would stand 
and the court could sentence him to up to three years in prison under the cap. 
In addition, the court imposed Garvin conditions during the plea colloquy, spec-
ifying that if the man were to be “charged with a new arrest based on probable 
cause” or if the man violated a protective order before sentencing, the court 
could “hold [him] to [his] plea of guilty” and impose a prison sentence of up to 
five years. Id. 
 248. Trotman, 791 A.2d at 702. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 704. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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to four years to serve.254 Three months into the four-month pe-
riod, her urine sample tested positive for an opiate.255 She was 
brought before the court and denied using any drugs during the 
Testing Period.256 She said that poppy seeds might have caused 
the positive test or that there was a mix-up in the samples.257 
She brought a letter to the judge from her program counselor.258 
This letter indicated that “because the defendant had no prior 
record of using opiates,” the counselor “personally felt that the 
drug test was ‘questionable.’”259 As “sole arbiter of the testi-
mony,” however, the judge did not believe the defendant’s claim 
not to have used drugs and “was not persuaded that the viability, 
reliability, or accuracy of the test results should be called into 
question.”260 He therefore sentenced her to four years in prison, 
a sentence that was upheld by the appellate court.261 
b. The Low Evidentiary Standard Applicable to Garvin 
Testing Periods 
Despite the high stakes, the evidentiary standards for adju-
dicating a Garvin violation are notably low. Judges may impose 
an enhanced sentence under a Garvin agreement if there is 
“minimum indicia of reliability” that the defendant violated one 
of the Garvin conditions.262 The shallowness of this evidentiary 
standard creates additional vulnerability for defendants during 
the Garvin Testing Period. The “minimal indicia of reliability” 
standard is significantly lower, for example, than the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard that applies to an alleged violation 
of probation.263  
The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, has found 
that a probable cause determination can satisfy the “minimal in-
dicia of reliability” standard.264 In a 2006 case, State v. Stevens, 
 
 254. Id. at 702. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 703. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 705. 
 262. State v. Brown, 75 A.3d 713, 722 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013). 
 263. Id. 
 264. State v. Stevens, 895 A.2d 771, 776 (Conn. 2006). 
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the Court endorsed a Garvin condition that prohibited the de-
fendant from being arrested if a judge found that the arrest was 
based on probable cause.265 This condition, which is also used in 
the context of cap deals and drug court, is known colloquially as 
a “no arrest” condition.266 
Although the Connecticut Supreme Court ultimately upheld 
the “no arrest” condition in Stevens, the case sparked a debate 
over what conditions are truly within a defendant’s control.267 
The appellate court had overturned the condition, emphasizing 
that in its view, “being arrested, similar to being struck by light-
ning, can be the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong 
time.”268 In reversing the appellate court, the Connecticut Su-
preme Court relied on the fact that the trial court had made a 
probable cause finding for the arrest, and there was no record of 
the defendant disputing the allegations surrounding the ar-
rest.269 Accordingly, the Court found that the breach of the con-
dition created a sufficient basis for imposing an enhanced sen-
tence.270 It upheld the trial court’s decision to impose a seven-
year prison sentence, four years more than the three-year prison 
sentence the defendant had negotiated.271 
One justice would have found the “no arrest” condition un-
constitutional in part because of real-world disparities in how it 
would apply.272 His opinion emphasized: 
The undeniable reality is that, like the defendant in the present case, 
many criminal defendants reside in disadvantaged urban environ-
ments and are not strangers to a heightened police presence. Thus, to 
take the Appellate Court’s lightning analogy one step further, many 
defendants are released pursuant to Garvin agreements into situations 
that are akin to walking on an open field with a metal tipped umbrella 
in a thunderstorm.273  
 
 265. E.g., id. at 779; see also, e.g., State v. Hudson, 191 A.3d 1032, 1036 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2018) (emphasizing that in context of enforcing a no arrest con-
dition, relevant inquiry is whether there was probable cause for new arrest, not 
whether defendant is guilty of charges underlying the new arrest).  
 266. Stevens, 895 A.2d at 773. 
 267. State v. Stevens, 857 A.2d 972, 975–76 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 972–73. 
 270. Id. at 976. 
 271. Id. 
 272. State v. Stevens, 895 A.2d 771, 783 (Conn. 2006) (Norcott, J., concur-
ring). 
 273. Id.  
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To mitigate these disparities, the justice sought unsuccessfully 
to prohibit the use of a “no arrest” condition, replacing it with 
one that banned the defendant from actually committing a new 
crime.274 Equating the Garvin Testing Period to “a form of pro-
bation,” he also pushed his colleagues (to no avail) to incorporate 
the preponderance of the evidence standard into the Garvin pro-
cess.275  
In the wake of Stevens, courts have used both the “minimum 
indicia of reliability” standard and the “probable cause” standard 
to adjudicate alleged violations of Garvin conditions.276 In one 
case, for example, the court used the probable cause standard to 
find that a defendant had breached a Garvin condition that re-
quired him to comply with a curfew.277 In another case, the court 
used the minimum indicia of reliability standard to determine 
that the defendant had breached a Garvin condition by “failing 
to abide by the rules and regulations” of a year-long behavior 
modification program.278 Although the defendant completed the 
program, he had unexcused absences and engaged in disruptive 
behavior along the way.279 If he had succeeded during the Garvin 
Testing Period, the defendant would have received a fully sus-
pended sentence.280 Instead, he was sentenced to eighteen 
months in prison.281 
C. KEY FEATURES OF TESTING PERIODS IDENTIFIED 
In this Part, I identified and analyzed six mechanisms in 
Connecticut that create Testing Periods. Two of these mecha-
nisms create “sentenced” Testing Periods (probation and condi-
tional discharge), and four create “on-file” Testing Periods (plea-
and-withdraw, caps, drug court, and Garvin agreements). While 
these mechanisms differ in their details, and are not tradition-
ally analyzed as similar structures, they share fundamental 
characteristics: (1) a test is imposed on defendants; (2) defend-
ants agree to plead guilty to become eligible for the procedural 
 
 274. Id. at 779.  
 275. Id. at 780.  
 276. State v. Brown, 75 A.3d 713, 716 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013); State v. Peta-
way, No. CR040028093, 2007 WL 901648, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2007). 
 277. Petaway, 2007 WL 901648, at *5. 
 278. Brown, 75 A.3d at 716. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 717. 
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opportunity that the test represents (the opportunity to avoid 
prison); (3) the locus of inquiry for the incarceration decision 
shifts away from the facts underlying the charge, towards 
whether the defendant can pass the test by following a set of pro-
spective rules for a defined period; and (4) similar (often identi-
cal) rules establish the criteria for what it means to succeed or 
to fail at these tests, and thereby to decide which defendants 
should go to prison, and for what reasons. 
III.  TESTING PERIODS IN OTHER STATES   
These testing devices are in no way unique to Connecticut. 
Uncovering parallels in state practices, however, requires an in-
depth examination of individual state case law. To begin to illu-
minate the connections across state lines, I show how the same 
kinds of Testing Periods I have highlighted in Connecticut also 
shape outcomes in criminal cases across the country. 
As in Part II, I begin by exploring the dynamics created by 
the “sentenced” model and then turn to the “on-file” model. I 
keep the discussion of the “sentenced” model relatively short, be-
cause I have analyzed its legal framework extensively in other 
work.282 Instead, I focus on examples of the “on-file” model, 
which has been much less studied, but which I argue forms an-
other key component of the Testing Period methodology.  
A. SENTENCED MODEL TESTING PERIODS 
To illustrate parallels in the “sentenced” model, I draw pri-
marily from cases in Texas and California. I do so because Texas 
and California are the two states with the largest overall correc-
tional populations.283 In both states, moreover, the size of the 
probation population significantly exceeds the size of the prison 
population.284 
Prosecutors and judges in Texas and California use fully-
suspended time arrangements much like their counterparts in 
 
 282. See generally Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation 
and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291 (2016) (analyzing how the 
conditions of probation contribute to overcriminalization). 
 283. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251211, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2016, at 12 (Caitlin Scoville & Jill Thomas eds., 2018). 
 284. Id.; DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 
13–14 tbl.2 (Caitlin Scoville & Jill Thomas eds., 2018). 
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Connecticut: to facilitate guilty pleas and to sort defendants for 
either custodial or non-custodial outcomes.285 A defendant 
agrees to plead guilty in return for a sentence that sets up the 
Testing Period. In California, judges commonly create this Test-
ing Period through a sentence of probation.286 Underscoring the 
confusion in terminology, the equivalent device is called “com-
munity supervision” in Texas, rather than probation, although 
those on community supervision do report to “probation offic-
ers.”287 As part of the plea deal in both states, the judge sen-
tences the defendant to a fully-suspended prison term, which 
hangs over the defendant’s head during the Testing Period.288 
Defendants plead guilty in return for the assurance that they 
will not go to prison as a consequence of that plea—unless they 
violate a condition of the Testing Period.289 
As I have explored elsewhere, conditions in the “sentenced” 
model are particularly broad in Texas and California, as they are 
in many other states.290 Defendants must follow conditions like 
obey all laws, avoid injurious and vicious habits, stay away from 
 
 285. See, e.g., Ex parte Gonzalez, 402 S.W.3d 843, 844 (Tex. App. 2013) (not-
ing that defendant had pleaded guilty “in accordance with a plea bargain agree-
ment” and that in “exchange for his guilty plea, the trial court suspended” the 
defendant’s ten-year prison sentence and placed him on community supervi-
sion); Woodard v. State, No. 14-08-00606-CR, 2008 WL 2841593, at *1 (Tex. 
App. July 24, 2008) (suspending a prison term and ordering community super-
vision “[i]n accordance with the terms of a plea bargain agreement with the 
State”). 
 286. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (2018) (“‘[P]robation’ means the 
suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of condi-
tional and revocable release in the community under the supervision of a pro-
bation officer.”); People v. Kropp, No. C065098, 2011 WL 1459686, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2011) (imposing a fully-suspended prison term of four years 
and four months after finding that the probationer failed to keep the probation 
department accurately advised of his address and failed to timely report any 
arrests). It is important to emphasize, however, that suspension arrangements 
are only one form of probation in California; many people now begin probation 
supervision only after completing a custodial term. See, e.g., VIET NGUYEN, 
RYKEN GRATTET & MIA BIRD, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA PROBA-
TION IN THE ERA OF REFORM 3 (2017) (noting that after the Public Safety Rea-
lignment Act took effect in 2011, more people entered probation supervision af-
ter serving a state prison term or after serving the jail portion of a split 
sentence). 
 287. See, e.g., McCain v. State, No. 14-16-00254-CR, 2017 WL 3927486, at 
*1 (Tex. App. Sept. 7, 2017) (noting that the probation officer oversaw the de-
fendant on community supervision). 
 288. Kropp, 2011 WL 1459686, at *1; McCain, 2017 WL 3927486, at *1. 
 289. Kropp, 2011 WL 1459686, at *1; McCain, 2017 WL 3927486, at *1. 
 290. Doherty, supra note 282, at 305–13, 316, 322. 
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drugs and alcohol, work faithfully at suitable employment, re-
port to the probation officer as required, abide by the rules of a 
treatment program, and avoid persons and places of disreputa-
ble or harmful character.291 The breadth of these conditions pro-
vides judges and prosecutors with the power to sort those who 
can follow the rules from those who cannot. The deepest expres-
sion of this power lies in the ability to decide how closely to mon-
itor a defendant for compliance and how seriously to treat a vio-
lation.292 
In Texas, as in other states, a sentence of community super-
vision has been used to sort defendants on the basis of addic-
tion.293 In one case, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to a 
driving while intoxicated count in exchange for a sentence of five 
years of community supervision and a ten-year fully suspended 
prison term.294 According to his probation officer, he told her in 
a meeting that he had used drugs over a four-day period.295 He 
later insisted that he had admitted to using drugs on only one of 
those dates.296 In upholding the imposition of the ten-year prison 
sentence, the appellate court emphasized that any violation at 
all was sufficient to support the revocation of his community su-
pervision.297 
Testing Periods can also be used to identify defendants who 
are not making sufficient progress in treatment in the opinion of 
their treatment providers.298 The provider might decide to expel 
 
 291. Id. at 316–17. 
 292. Importantly, in an effort to begin addressing some of the problems dis-
cussed in this Article, some jurisdictions are experimenting with measures like 
reducing conditions, incentivizing positive behavior, and curbing the penalties 
available for the revocation of probation. See COLUMBIA UNIV. JUSTICE LAB, 
TOO BIG TO SUCCEED: THE IMPACT OF THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITY CORREC-
TIONS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 7 (2018). 
 293. See, e.g., People v. Lindsey, No. D048683, 2006 WL 3602920 (Cal. App. 
Ct. Dec. 12, 2006) (imposing a fully-suspended four-year prison term after pro-
bationer tested positive for crack cocaine and possessed a razor blade that con-
tained crack residue); Jones v. State, No. 10-17-00118-CR, 2018 WL 327501, at 
*1 (Tex. App. May 23, 2018) (revoking community supervision and imposing a 
sixty-year prison sentence in part because the defendant failed to complete out-
patient drug treatment after a positive test for cocaine). 
 294. Parker v. State, No. 05-13-01535-CR, 2014 WL 7497800, at *4 (Tex. 
App. Dec. 29, 2014). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See, e.g., People v. Odom, No. D064625, 2014 WL 6630107, at *1–2 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014) (imposing fully-suspended five-year prison term after 
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a defendant from a program, even though completing that pro-
gram was a condition of the sentence. In one such case in Texas, 
the treatment provider expelled a defendant from a sex-offender 
counseling program in part because of his “secretiveness about 
his sexual behavior.”299 One basis for this conclusion was that 
the defendant had refused to tell his fiancée that he was having 
an affair, even though the therapist had encouraged him to do 
so.300 As a result of his expulsion from the program, the court 
revoked the defendant’s community supervision and imposed a 
ten-year prison term, which had been fully suspended at the 
time of his plea.301 In upholding this outcome, the appellate court 
noted: “Successful completion of a court-ordered sex offender 
treatment program necessarily requires more than mere partic-
ipation in the program; it requires improvement, or—at the very 
least—demonstration of an attempt to improve through imple-
mentation of the skills imparted in therapy.”302  
Like in Connecticut—and many other states—the defend-
ant’s probation or community supervision can be revoked based 
on conduct for which the defendant was acquitted by a jury.303 
The California Supreme Court has held that a “prior acquittal in 
a criminal proceeding does not bar subsequent [probation revo-
cation] proceedings based upon the same underlying facts.”304 
Appellate courts in Texas have similarly upheld revocation sen-
tences that are based on acquitted conduct.305  
 
the defendant tested positive for drugs, missed drug testing, and a drug treat-
ment provider indicated his attendance and participation at treatment were 
“unsatisfactory”). 
 299. Kelly v. State, No. 08-12-00291-CR, 2014 WL 3853872, at *2 (Tex. App. 
Aug. 6, 2014). 
 300. Id. at *1 (finding other bases for the conclusion such as a hearsay state-
ment from the defendant’s therapist that she “became aware of sexual actions” 
the defendant took towards his sleeping wife and defendant’s failure to improve 
in penile plethysmography testing). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at *2. 
 303. People v. Crawley, No. B243199, 2013 WL 6632013, at *1 (Cal. App. Ct. 
Dec. 16, 2013). 
 304. In re Coughlin, 545 P.2d 249, 253 (Cal. 1976); see also Crawley, 2013 
WL 6632013, at *1 (upholding a revocation where the probationer “was found 
not guilty after a jury trial; but the court, based upon the same evidence, found 
he had violated his probation and imposed the previously suspended five-year 
prison term”). 
 305. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, No. 13-15-00074-CR, 2016 WL 836695, at *2–
3 (Tex. App. Mar. 3, 2016); Black v. State, 411 S.W.3d 25, 30 (Tex. App. 2013). 
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Like their counterparts in Connecticut, courts in California 
and Texas encourage defendants to agree to Testing Periods in 
plea deals by marketing them as a way for defendants to escape 
punishment. California courts, for example, emphasize that pro-
bation is “not punishment but is instead an ‘act of clemency in 
lieu of punishment.’”306 Texas courts characterize community su-
pervision as an act of clemency that suspends punishment.307 
These framing techniques help to mask the hefty risks and di-
minished leverage that accompany every such sentence. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has characterized the 
depths of these risks in perhaps the most vivid terms. Rhode Is-
land is an important state in the world of probation because it 
uses probation so heavily as a sentence. One in every thirty-five 
adult residents of Rhode Island is on probation, the second high-
est rate in the United States.308 
In 2004, the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on an ancient 
tale, “The Sword of Damocles,” to illustrate the precarious posi-
tion of those on probation.309 It did so in a case in which the de-
fendant, who had agreed to plead nolo contendere to criminal 
charges, was originally sentenced to a fully-suspended ten-year 
prison term with ten years of probation.310 Eight years later, the 
trial court revoked the sentence of probation and executed the 
ten-year prison term.311 In upholding this outcome, the Supreme 
Court analogized the plight facing probationers to that facing 
Damocles in Cicero’s long-ago tale.312 Damocles had gotten him-
self into a predicament when he switched places with King Dio-
nysus II for a day—and was busy reveling in the luxuries of the 
palace—when he looked up and saw a sword suspended over his 
 
 306. People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 440, 442–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003). 
 307. Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (empha-
sizing that probation is a privilege, rather than a right, and benefits the proba-
tioner); Pedraza v. State, 562 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (“Proba-
tion is not such an assessment of punishment; it suspends punishment and is 
in the nature of clemency.”). 
 308. See DANIELLE KAEBLE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250230, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 17 tbl.2 (Caitlin Scoville & Jill Thomas eds., 2017) 
(noting that 2822 people per 100,000 adult residents are on probation in Rhode 
Island).  
 309. State v. Parson, 844 A.2d 178, 180–81 (R.I. 2004). 
 310. Id. at 179. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 180–81. 
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head by a thread.313 The court used the threat represented by 
this sword to explain what it meant to be on probation: “Like the 
sword of Damocles, the unexecuted portion of a probationer’s 
suspended sentence hangs over his or her head by the single 
horsehair of good behavior, until such time as the term of proba-
tion expires.”314 The court went on to emphasize that by violating 
the conditions of his probation, the defendant had “severed the 
horsehair” and “the sword of incarceration fell upon his head.”315  
The Damocles analogy only works, however, if defendants 
understand—and can meaningfully control—the risks they face 
while on probation. As the court notes in its opinion, Damocles 
had the advantage of seeing with his own eyes the “sharp sword” 
that was “dangling above him” and realizing that there was 
“danger every moment” that the hair would break.316 This dan-
ger caused the “smile to fade from his lips” and his face to turn 
“ashy pale.”317 The risks were too much for him, and he begged 
to leave the palace in order to escape the ever-present threat of 
the sword.318 Unlike many people in Testing Periods, he came to 
appreciate the dangers before it was too late.319  
B. ON-FILE MODEL TESTING PERIODS 
In this Section, I provide a comparative analysis of state “on-
file” Testing Periods to show how they shape outcomes in cases 
across the country through the use of the same criteria (such as 
the ability to maintain clean screens for drugs or alcohol). I draw 
from Texas case law, for example, to showcase plea deals that 
use a variation of the plea and withdraw offer. I then use New 
York law to illuminate a parallel version of caps and Garvin 
agreements, including the imposition of “no arrest” conditions. 
 
 313. Evan Andrews, What Was the Sword of Damocles?, HIST. (Feb. 17, 
2016), https://www.history.com/news/what-was-the-sword-of-damocles. 
 314. Parson, 844 A.2d at 180. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at n.2. 
 317. Id. at 180. 
 318. Id. at 180–81. 
 319. See Timothy Baldwin & Olin Thompson, More Horse-Hair for the Sword 
of Damocles? The Rhode Island Probation System and Comparisons to Federal 
Law, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 244, 253 (2016) (“The Rhode Island practice 
of long suspended sentences coupled with long periods of probation looks innoc-
uous on paper and has an indicia of leniency. Ultimately, however, the frame-
work leads to significantly reduced due process for the many criminal defend-
ants that cycle through the probation violation system.”). 
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Finally, I show how the legal framework of various alternative 
courts relies on the same supercharged indeterminacy structure. 
Because alternative courts are exploding in popularity across the 
country, I provide examples from states with large numbers of 
these courts, including California, Georgia, Michigan, and Illi-
nois. 
1. Deferred Adjudication in Texas 
Texas courts operate an “on-file” testing system called “de-
ferred adjudication.”320 Deferred adjudication operates after a 
guilty plea but before sentencing.321 It is similar to the plea and 
withdraw model in Connecticut, although with wider applica-
tion.322 Deferred adjudication accounts for nearly sixty percent 
of community supervision placements in Texas.323  
Under deferred adjudication, the defendant must agree to 
plead guilty in order to secure the chance of earning an eventual 
dismissal of the case.324 In return, the judge agrees to put off (or 
defer) accepting the guilty plea, while the defendant undergoes 
the post-plea Testing Period.325 To set up this Testing Period, the 
court places the defendant on “deferred adjudication community 
supervision.”326 If the defendant follows the court’s conditions 
during the required interval, the judge never formally records 
the guilty plea.327 But if the defendant violates one of the condi-
tions, the judge can enter a finding of guilt and proceed to sen-
tence the defendant on the plea.328 
The delayed entry of the guilty plea facilitates plea bargain-
ing because it makes the guilty plea seem less real, even as the 
defendant is actually pleading guilty. The guilty plea—in addi-
tion to the sentence—now hangs in the air, as the defendant is 
put to the test. Defendants know that as long as they pass the 
test, the guilty plea will vanish for good. 
 
 320. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.101(a) (West 2017). 
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 322. Supra Part II.B.2. 
 323. TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FY 2017 STATISTICAL REPORT 7 
(2017). 
 324. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.101(a). 
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Violating a condition of the deferred adjudication period, 
however, can mean the difference between no conviction at all 
and a lengthy prison sentence.329 In one case, for example, a de-
fendant agreed to plead guilty to possessing cocaine and codeine 
under a deferred adjudication arrangement.330 The judge laid 
out the stakes in the following terms: 
  The Court: While you’re under our supervision, you must comply 
with all of the conditions that are set. 
  [Defendant]: Yes, sir. 
  The Court: If you do that, your cases will be dismissed—completely 
wiped off. But, if you don’t, if you break a condition, you could get up to 
20 years in the penitentiary. That’s what is at stake. Do you under-
stand that completely? 
  [Defendant]: Yes, sir.331 
This defendant did not make it through the Testing Period, and 
he received twenty years in prison as a result.332 
Deferred adjudication shifts power to trial judges by allow-
ing them both to create a test and to decide what it means to fail. 
A 2015 Texas case illustrates just how much discretion courts 
have in making this judgment.333 The defendant was charged 
with possessing less than one gram of cocaine and tampering 
with evidence because cocaine was found on the ground after she 
was told to exit a car during a traffic stop.334 She agreed to plead 
guilty to the charges under a deferred-adjudication arrange-
ment, which came with a five-year Testing Period.335 She was 
later charged with violating the conditions of her supervision, 
including by failing to report to her probation officer, failing to 
 
 329. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, No. 13-16-00500-CR, 2018 WL 2979827, at 
*1, 4 (Tex. App. June 14, 2018) (sentencing the defendant to twenty years in 
prison in a deferred adjudication case for violating the terms of his probation); 
Hammack v. State, 466 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. App. 2015) (sentencing the de-
fendant to six months in prison in a deferred adjudication case in which the 
defendant had violated a rule of the treatment program prohibiting “roman-
tic/sexual relationships with peers or staff ” ); Patterson v. State, No. 14-09-
00277-CR, 2010 WL 1406322, at *2–3 (Tex. App. Apr. 8, 2010) (sentencing the 
defendant who had pleaded guilty to a deferred adjudication arrangement to 
twenty years in prison for violating the terms of his community supervision). 
 330. Green v. State, 242 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 217. 
 333. Pena v. State, No. 13-14-00291-CR, 2015 WL 3634463, at *1 (Tex. App. 
Dec. 16, 2015). 
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submit to urinalysis testing, and failing to attend treatment.336 
She was taken into custody and wrote to the judge saying that 
she needed an early court date because she was a single mother 
with three children.337 On the court date, she admitted to the 
violations.338 She also told the court that she shared custody of 
the children with their father, who lived separately from her.339 
She explained that her situation was urgent because the chil-
dren had reported being neglected and abused at their father’s 
house, and these reports were being investigated by Child Pro-
tective Services.340 The record reflects that the judge got angry 
upon hearing that the defendant shared custody of the children 
with their father, deciding that she had deliberately misrepre-
sented her custody status in the letter to the court.341 Although 
the state had recommended that the defendant be allowed to en-
ter another program, the judge adjudicated her guilty (based on 
her earlier guilty pleas) and sentenced her to two years in 
prison.342  
Because Texas uses community supervision (its standard 
probation system) to monitor defendants on deferred adjudica-
tion, it has incorporated the protections that apply to sentences 
of probation into the deferred adjudication model. The state 
must prove violations of a condition of deferred adjudication by 
a preponderance of the evidence.343 As discussed below, however, 
other states have used the “on-file” methodology to decline to ap-
ply the preponderance standard and other due process protec-
tions.344 
2. On-File Testing Periods and Outley Standards in New York 
New York case law reveals a host of “on-file” testing ar-
rangements that bear a striking resemblance to their Connecti-
cut counterparts. New York has an “interim probation” system, 
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for example, that largely mirrors the cap plea structure in Con-
necticut.345 Many New York drug courts function on plea-and-
withdraw-346 and cap-like models.347 The New York version of 
the Garvin agreement operates through what are known as 
“Outley” hearings.348 
The similarities in plea structure are illustrated by a New 
York drug court case in which a defendant agreed to plead guilty 
to two misdemeanor counts of petit larceny in exchange for the 
chance to earn a conditional discharge in drug court.349 After he 
pleaded guilty, he told the judge that he did not “plan on goofin’ 
up,” but then asked: 
  THE DEFENDANT: If I goof up, is there a time cap on that? 
  THE COURT: Yeah, two years. 
  THE DEFENDANT: Well, Your Honor— 
  THE COURT: Do you want to go to trial? 
  THE DEFENDANT: No, I’ll take it. 
  THE COURT: Just to ease your pain, if you fail Drug Court, I’m 
going to put you in jail for two years. Do you understand that? 
  THE DEFENDANT: Yes.350  
The defendant did not succeed in drug court, and the court sen-
tenced him to two years in jail, the longest possible sentence the 
court had the authority to impose.351 
New York judges, like judges in Connecticut, can impose a 
“no arrest” condition during an “on-file” Testing Period, provok-
ing a similar debate about whether being arrested is within a 
defendant’s control. In 1993, in People v. Outley, the New York 
 
 345. See, e.g., People v. Gilliam, 162 A.D.3d 1413 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); Peo-
ple v. Savage, 70 N.Y.S.3d 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); People v. Scott, 63 
N.Y.S.3d 629 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017); People v. Kocher, 984 N.Y.S.2d 244 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2014). 
 346. People v. Nedlik, 144 A.D.3d 1324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016); People v. Mills, 
52 Misc. 3d 1209(A), at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016); People v. Radonich, No. 5361/14, 
2015 WL 6700874, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2015). 
 347. People v. Braye, 161 A.D.3d 1456 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); People v. Cy-
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have defendants participate in drug court as a condition of probation. See, e.g., 
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 349. People v. Miller, 15 Misc. 3d 1127(A), at *1–2 (Monroe Co. Ct. 2006). 
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Court of Appeals endorsed a no arrest condition in enforcing New 
York’s version of the Garvin agreement (or conditional plea 
agreement).352 The defendant had agreed to plead guilty to en-
dangering the welfare of a child in hopes of receiving a sentence 
of probation.353 At the time of the plea, the judge agreed to sen-
tence the defendant to a period of probation “not to exceed three 
years provided that defendant ‘not be arrested on any other 
charges during [the] adjournment period.’”354 The defendant was 
arrested in the adjournment period (the Testing Period) because 
he returned to his former home in violation of protective orders 
that had been issued against him.355 Although the circumstances 
were disputed, the judge sentenced the defendant to one year in 
custody, instead of probation, in light of the arrest in the Testing 
Period.356 
In upholding the enhanced sentence, the Outley court found 
that enforcing a “no arrest” condition did not require any finding 
that the defendant had actually committed a crime.357 The de-
fense had asked that the trial court be forced to conduct an evi-
dentiary hearing to at least satisfy itself by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant had committed the new crime.358 
The state appellate court rejected this argument on the grounds 
that imposing such a rule “would have the effect of changing the 
condition of the plea bargain from not being arrested for a crime 
to not actually committing a crime.”359 It would have the “unde-
sirable consequence” of requiring a “mini-trial” on the defend-
ant’s guilt or innocence on the new charge.360 
The Outley court adopted a standard for evaluating the new 
arrest that is very similar to Connecticut’s probable cause stand-
ard. While proof that the defendant committed the new crime 
 
 352. Outley, 610 N.E.2d at 358. For examples of similar devices in other ju-
risdictions, see, People v. Masloski, 25 P.3d 681, 688 (Cal. 2001); People v. 
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was not necessary, the court had to give the defendant an oppor-
tunity to show that the arrest was without foundation.361 The 
court could impose the enhanced sentence if it was satisfied “not 
of defendant’s guilt of the new criminal charge but of the exist-
ence of a legitimate basis for the arrest on that charge.”362 
A 2000 case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit highlighted the problem raised by the Stevens concurrence 
in Connecticut: the defendant’s inability to control whether or 
not he was arrested. In this Second Circuit case, Spence v. Su-
perintendent, the defendant had agreed to plead guilty to a rob-
bery in New York state court and to accept an “on-file” Testing 
Period of one year.363 If the defendant succeeded during the Test-
ing Period, he would receive probation and “probably” be given 
youthful offender status.364 But if he failed, he would be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for a term of eight-and-a-third to 
twenty-five years, the maximum possible sentence for the rob-
bery offense.365 
The trial judge had imposed a no arrest condition on the de-
fendant for the Testing Period, but the judge had muddied the 
waters by suggesting that getting arrested was a choice within 
the defendant’s control.366 The judge told the defendant:  
If you get rearrested, that’s a voluntary choice you made by going out 
and doing something which you should not have been doing. It rests 
solely with you. If you get rearrested . . . I’m going to sentence you up 
to the maximum time allowed by law—again it’s eight and a third to 
25.367  
When the defendant did get arrested during the Testing Period, 
he denied guilt and claimed to have five alibi witnesses, includ-
ing two city probation employees.368 The court refused to adjourn 
sentencing on the original plea, however, and imposed the prom-
ised eight-and-a-third to twenty-five-year sentence on the basis 
of the new arrest.369  
 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id.; see also People v. Terry, 830 N.Y.S.2d 659, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) 
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 364. Id. at 166. 
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The Second Circuit relied on the court’s confusing language 
about an arrest being within the defendant’s control to grant his 
habeas petition.370 In the meantime, a jury had acquitted the de-
fendant of the charge underlying the new arrest. However, by 
the time the habeas case made it up to the Second Circuit, the 
man had already been imprisoned for eight years.371 
A 2003 Second Circuit case, Torres v. Berbary, once again 
addressed an “on-file” Testing Period in New York state court, 
attempting to impose a preponderance standard for violations of 
Outley conditions during this period.372 The Second Circuit’s 
opinion was met with outright rebellion by state trial courts, 
egged on by federal trial courts in New York.  
Berbary was an “on-file” case that required a New York de-
fendant to complete a drug treatment program as a condition of 
his plea agreement.373 The defendant had agreed to plead guilty 
to the sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (a felony) 
in exchange for the chance to get the felony plea reduced to a 
misdemeanor and a time-served sentence.374 The state judge ex-
plained the deal to the defendant in the following terms:  
  THE COURT: Okay. I am going to sentence you. I will release you 
on the 23rd to Phoenix House [the drug treatment program]. If you work 
out, you will be allowed to come back, re-plead to a misdemeanor, and 
I will sentence you [to] time served. If you don’t work out, you will get 
at least four and a half to nine years in jail. Do you understand? 
  THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
  THE COURT: Is that satisfactory to you? 
  THE DEFENDANT: Yes.375  
The defendant was subsequently ejected from the drug treat-
ment program based on a claim that other residents of the pro-
gram had overhead him discussing the possibility of making 
drugs available for sale within the facility.376 Based on this 
claim, the state judge sentenced the defendant to the “promised” 
term: four-and-a-half to nine years in jail.377  
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The Second Circuit granted the defendant’s writ of habeas 
corpus, finding that the state court should not have relied exclu-
sively on double and triple hearsay reports.378 Extrapolating 
from the law governing the sentenced model, the Second Circuit 
held that the trial court should have applied a preponderance of 
the evidence standard in deciding whether a condition of the “on-
file” model had been violated.379  
The push back from trial courts was immediate. Two weeks 
after the Second Circuit issued its Berbary opinion, a federal dis-
trict court in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY) raised 
the alarm about its implications for state trial judges.380 It did 
so while denying a habeas petition that had raised a due process 
challenge to a similar “on-file” arrangement. The EDNY opinion 
began by decrying the “serious problem about what some might 
see as attempts by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to 
impose federal standards on state sentencing procedures.”381 
The court emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court had never 
required state courts to use the preponderance standard when 
deciding on an appropriate sentence. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
had recognized that “[s]entencing courts have traditionally 
heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden 
of proof at all.”382 
Subsequent trial court decisions have followed the EDNY’s 
Coleman opinion in criticizing the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Berbary. In a 2004 case, for example, a New York state court 
imposed an enhanced sentence on a defendant for the violation 
of a “no-arrest” condition without holding a fact-finding hearing 
on whether the defendant had committed the crime.383 In deter-
mining whether the defendant had violated the “no arrest” con-
dition in the plea agreement, the court applied the Outley “legit-
imate basis” standard, quoting Coleman’s characterization of the 
Second Circuit’s approach in Berbary as “unfounded.”384 Subse-
 
 378. Id. at 71. 
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 381. Id. at 552–53. 
 382. Id. at 560 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)). 
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quent courts have continued to use the legitimate basis stand-
ard.385 
3. Problem-Solving Courts 
Many drug courts—and other problem-solving courts—have 
come to rely on the “on-file” testing models I am exploring in this 
Article. The first generation of drug courts operated largely on a 
pre-plea basis; a defendant did not have to plead guilty to a crime 
in order to get admitted into the court. Over the years, however, 
drug courts have largely abandoned the pre-plea diversionary 
formula. According to the latest figures, only six percent of drug 
courts now operate on a pre-plea model.386  
Instead, a huge number of drug courts now run on the “on-
file” model. The defendant agrees to plead guilty to a crime in 
exchange for the same tantalizing prize, the chance to avoid 
prison.387 Sometimes, defendants are also told that the guilty 
plea will be vacated when they graduate from drug court: an it-
eration of the plea and withdraw offer.388 The conditions of the 
Testing Period are broad, and the penalties for failure can be ex-
tremely high. 
A 2014 Illinois drug court case, which involved the retroac-
tive imposition of a no arrest condition, provides an example of 
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a defendant ceding all future leverage in exchange for the chance 
to earn a conditional discharge.389 The defendant had agreed to 
plead guilty to one count of burglary to enter a drug court pro-
gram. Under the plea agreement, success in drug court would 
result in a conditional discharge. But failure would mean ten 
years in prison. The plea agreement further provided: “If the de-
fendant commits a new felony offense, or DUI, the [S]tate shall 
immediately file a Petition to Unsuccessfully Discharge the de-
fendant from the program. The case shall proceed to the sentenc-
ing hearing pursuant to the plea and predetermined sen-
tence.”390 As a prerequisite of entering drug court, moreover, the 
defendant had to sign away all of his appeal rights: “I waive any 
and all rights to appeal I may have in the event I am dismissed 
from the DeKalb County Drug Court, and understand and con-
sent to the Court and DeKalb County Drug Court Team being 
the sole authority for determining such dismissal.”391 Approxi-
mately one year later, the defendant was arrested and charged 
with a new theft offense.392 The state moved to terminate him 
from drug court on account of this new arrest. The defendant 
protested that, under the terms in the plea agreement, the State 
had to show that he had actually committed a new felony offense, 
not that he had been charged with a new felony offense.393 The 
trial court did not dispute this language, but it granted the 
State’s termination petition anyway, finding that “past prac-
tices” have been that “[a]ny individual who has been charged 
with a felony offense has been discharged unsatisfactorily from 
the program based on that offense.”394 The court imposed the 
ten-year prison term, and the appellate court refused to consider 
the defendant’s argument because of the waiver of appeal.395 
Defendants in problem-solving courts routinely agree to for-
feit an extraordinary number of rights for the chance to avoid 
prison. The rights waivers are generally listed in pre-printed 
“contracts” that defendants must sign as a condition of entry into 
a problem-solving court. In some jurisdictions, the scope of the 
waivers seems to be limited only by the inventiveness of the 
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judges and prosecutors in devising ways to shift power to them-
selves. The fact that defendants sign these contracts shows how 
much they are willing to give up for the chance to avoid prison. 
A plea agreement from California illustrates how some prob-
lem-solving courts have gone about getting defendants to forfeit 
protections that would otherwise apply. In People v. Freeman, a 
2012 case, the defendant pleaded guilty to a drug possession 
crime and was “granted drug court probation.”396 Although the 
defendant was entering a drug court that was referred to as a 
form of probation, the court required him to waive most of the 
rights that are attendant to the “sentenced” model of probation 
in California.397 In particular, the court made him waive any 
right to a hearing if he was alleged to have violated a condition 
that applied in drug court.398 He was also required to waive the 
“Court Reporter’s presence for all proceedings” and the require-
ment that the department of probation file a formal petition to 
revoke his probation.399 
The vulnerability of the defendant’s position was high-
lighted when the judge used his “disrespectful” attitude to im-
pose a three-month jail sanction and change the terms of the deal 
to include a nine-year suspended prison term.400 Approximately 
a year after the defendant first entered drug court, and after he 
had successfully completed the residential treatment compo-
nent, the court concluded that he had not been sufficiently coop-
erative in treatment.401 The court congratulated the defendant 
for achieving eight months of sobriety, but then faulted him for 
his attitude in treatment: “It’s been brought to my attention that 
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you are at times disruptive, acting very juvenile in class, in meet-
ings. You’re disrespectful. You’re defiant. You question every-
thing. And it appears to me you need an attitude adjustment.”402 
To punish the defendant for this attitude problem, the court 
placed him in prison for three months; it then released him back 
on a probationary Testing Period only after imposing a nine-year 
fully-suspended prison term to provide additional leverage 
against the defendant going forward.403  
In the end, the judge ordered the defendant to serve the full 
nine years in prison under circumstances that illustrate the dy-
namics of the Testing Period. The court imposed this sentence 
because it found that the defendant had failed to obey the court’s 
order not to reside with his “girlfriend or wife.”404 The defendant 
argued that although he did keep items at his girlfriend’s house, 
he did not live with her. Without conducting a fact-finding hear-
ing to resolve the dispute, the court refused to allow the defend-
ant to complete the drug court program and imposed the full nine 
years, even while recognizing the defendant as “one of the hard-
est workers in the program.”405 
In another California case, the defendant waived not only 
the right to a violation hearing, but also “the right to challenge 
any drug test” as part of the “Drug Court Application and Agree-
ment.”406 The defendant had agreed to plead guilty to drug pos-
session charges and enter a drug court Testing Period in the 
hopes of earning three years’ probation. The defendant was later 
terminated from the drug court because he was found to have 
manipulated a drug test. Instead of probation, the defendant was 
sentenced to six years in prison.407 
Problem-solving courts in Michigan have likewise de-
manded that defendants give up rights that normally accompany 
the “sentenced” model, including the right to be represented by 
counsel. The manual on “Developing and Implementing a Drug 
Treatment Court in Michigan” emphasizes:  
Program violations are not treated like probation violations. Once an 
offender agrees to participate in drug court, he or she waives the right 
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to counsel at review hearings that may involve administering a sanc-
tion. The sanction may be a loss of liberty. Should the participant object 
to the imposed sanction, the court must advise the participant that a 
formal objection is equivalent to withdrawing from the program.408  
The Ingham County veterans’ treatment court, a type of drug 
court in Michigan, routinely requires participants to sign con-
tracts with provisions like: “My attorney will no longer represent 
me;” and “I understand that sanctions may be imposed at any 
time by the [judge] without formal violation charge and/or hear-
ing. I waive the right to formal charge, a hearing, and represen-
tation by an attorney.”409 
The guiding philosophy of these “on-file” court systems is to 
ensure that participants are staying “clean” from alcohol or 
drugs, while externalizing the risk of error onto the participants, 
themselves. A standard-issue participant handbook from Michi-
gan, for example, asserts that the court’s drug and alcohol test-
ing procedures are “scientifically reliable,” while advising de-
fendants that a wide array of medications, hygiene products, and 
food substances may cause a ‘false’ positive test result.410 The 
handbook tells participants: “It is your responsibility to avoid or 
limit your exposure to these products.”411 It then provides a list 
of potentially problematic products that includes cold and al-
lergy medications, sleeping aids, weight loss products, vitamins, 
bread containing poppy seeds, non-alcoholic beverages, and sol-
vents and lacquers. The manual warns: “If you ingest or expose 
yourself to these substances, a positive result will receive a sanc-
tion.”412 
The National Drug Court Resource Center maintains an 
even more extensive list of products that participants must as-
sume responsibility for avoiding. In addition to the above prod-
ucts, the list requires participants to agree to avoid substances 
such as almond and vanilla extract, communion wine, creams or 
 
 408. MICH. SUPREME COURT ADMIN. OFFICE, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENT-
ING A DRUG TREATMENT COURT IN MICHIGAN 19, 42 (2012) (providing a model 
participation contract with the following waiver: “I agree that my attorney will 
not be present at any drug court proceedings.”). 
 409. INGHAM CTY. VETERANS TREATMENT CTR., PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 
10–12 (2014). 
 410. 20TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OTTAWA CTY. MICH., ADULT DRUG 
TREATMENT COURT: PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 9–10, http://www.miottawa.org/ 
Courts/20thCircuit/pdf/Participant_Handbook.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. 
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gels that contain alcohol, food cooked with wine, bug spray, co-
logne, and hair sprays.413 The contract also notes that partici-
pants must agree to “regulate their fluid intake to avoid dilute 
urine samples.”414 
The conditions (or rules) that justify revocation, meanwhile, 
can extend far beyond the requirement to personally abstain 
from drugs and alcohol.415 In a 2005 case, for example, a Georgia 
appeals court upheld a five-year prison term based on a violation 
of a broad associational restriction that was part of a drug court 
contract.416 The defendant had originally pleaded guilty to pos-
sessing marijuana and cocaine and entered a county drug court 
with the “understanding that if [he] failed to comply with any 
provision of the Drug Court Contract, the trial court would sen-
tence him on the drug possession charges.”417 The standard con-
tract required him “to avoid people or places of disreputable or 
harmful character. I understand this to include people currently 
on probation or parole and people with felony convictions, drug 
users and drug dealers.”418 After signing the contract, the de-
fendant agreed to give a ride to a person he had known for sev-
eral months, and this person was arrested for possessing 
drugs.419 Although the defendant was not arrested, the drug 
court judge sentenced him to five years in prison and five years 
of probation as a result of the associational violation during the 
Testing Period.420 
Judges in problem-solving courts have extended the testing 
parameters to cover requirements like the defendant’s style of 
dress and the respect that must be afforded to the drug court 
“team.” The chart below provides some rules from a drug court 
 
 413. NAT’L DRUG COURT RES. CTR., URINE ABSTINENCE TESTING AND INCI-
DENTAL ALCOHOL EXPOSURE CONTACT (2009), https://ndcrc.org/resource/urine 
-abstinence-testing-and-incidental-alcohol-exposure-contact. 
 414. Id. at 2. 
 415. See, e.g., CHESTER CTY. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, ADULT DRUG COURT 
PROGRAM PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK 11 (2017) (“Do not associate with people who 
use or possess drugs or be in areas known to have drug activity.”); TULSA 
COURTS PROGRAMS, TULSA COUNTY VETERANS TREATMENT COURT PARTICI-
PANT HANDBOOK 31 (2012) (“I will not associate with anyone who has a felony 
conviction, pending felony, who is currently on parole/probation or who is cur-
rently using alcohol and/or drugs . . . .”). 
 416. Andrews v. State, 623 S.E.2d 247, 247 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
 417. Id. at 249. 
 418. Id.  
 419. Id. at 249–50. 
 420. Id. at 250. 
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in Athens, Georgia.421 These provisions, which were incorpo-
rated into the drug court contract,422 are representative of the 
kinds of rules that have found their way into drug court proceed-
ings in many states.423 
 
Athens-Clarke County, Georgia 
Felony Drug Court Participant Handbook 
 
Clothing Rule  
Examples 
 
No ladies see-through blouses. 
No ladies mini-skirts or skirts with high slits. 
No sagging pants that hang below the waist. 
No jackets with hoods. 






I will avoid persons or places of disreputable or 
harmful character, including those on probation or 
parole and drug users. 
Interpersonal/sexual relationships (dating, up to 
sex) between participants in any phase of the drug 
court program will not be tolerated and such ac-
tions are sanctionable. 
 
The pre-printed contract for the same Georgia court requires 
its participants to waive due process rights upfront, while also 
 
 421. W. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FELONY DRUG COURT, STATE OF GA., PARTICI-
PANT HANDBOOK 15, 17, 19, 38, 41 [hereinafter GA. HANDBOOK], https://www 
.accgov.com/DocumentCenter/View/9400/Participant-Handbook?bidId= (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
 422. Id. at 41 (provision 23, page incorrectly numbered 38). 
 423. See, e.g., CHESTER CTY. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, supra note 415, at 
8 (banning, for example, sagging pants, unbuttoned shirts, shorts, tank tops and 
noting that if a participant “wears any of the above to the courtroom, they may 
be sent home and it will be counted as a court absence and appropriate sanctions 
imposed”); HAMILTON CTY. DRUG COURT, STATE OF TENN, PARTICIPANT HAND-
BOOK 11, https://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/11204/2072/3443.pdf?sequence= 
1&isAllowed=y (last visited Mar. 14, 2019) (prohibiting, for example, tank tops, 
unbuttoned shirts, mini skirts, clothes with flirtatious language, facial or 
tongue jewelry, and sagging pants, while noting: “If the participant wears any 
of the above to the courtroom, you will be sent home and it would be counted as 
a court absence and appropriate sanctions imposed.”). 
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requiring them to accept that the conditions that apply during 
the Testing Period may change over time.424 Under the contract, 
defendants must agree to follow any new rule that is announced 
while they are in the program.425 They must also authorize the 
judge to impose sanctions for any contract violation or “other in-
struction provided by the Drug Court Judge/Staff/Treatment 
Provider.”426 
A huge number of people fail in drug courts, a fact that is 
not always reported in drug court studies. Drug court completion 
rates in the United States have ranged from between thirty and 
seventy percent.427 Predictably, the more serious a person’s ad-
diction, the more likely he or she is to fail in drug court. Many 
drug court studies, however, have been criticized for including 
only those who graduate from the program and excluding those 
who fail.428 
Advocates of drug courts have been forced to acknowledge 
the disparate impact these courts have had on historically dis-
advantaged groups. According to the National Association of 
Drug Court Professionals, “[n]umerous studies show a signifi-
cantly smaller percentage of African Americans and Hispanic 
participants graduated from Drug Court compared to non-His-
panic Caucasians.”429 The reported differences in graduation 
rates by race were “as high as 25% to 40%.”430 In general, people 
of color and those with low incomes are more likely to be kicked 
out of drug courts.431 And being kicked out of drug court often 
means higher penalties than would have applied if the defendant 
had never enrolled.432  
 
 424. GA. HANDBOOK, supra note 421, at 41 (provisions 22, 23, & 26). 
 425. Id. (provision 26). 
 426. Id. (provision 24) (emphasis added).  
 427. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG 
COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS 
FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 62 (2005). 
 428. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., ADDICTED TO COURTS: HOW A GROWING 
DEPENDENCE ON DRUG COURTS IMPACTS PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES 10 (2011) 
(reporting that many drug court studies are based on people who complete drug 
court); REGINALD FLUELLEN & JENNIFER TRONE, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, DO 
DRUG COURTS SAVE JAIL AND PRISON BEDS? (2000) (discussing deficiencies in 
drug court studies). 
 429. CAROLYN D. HARDIN, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, ADDRESS-
ING THE DISPARITIES IN DRUG COURTS 21 (2016). 
 430. Id. 
 431. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 428, at 23. 
 432. Id. at 24 (failing results in harsher sanctions). 
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IV.  A RETURN TO TRIAL BY ORDEAL?   
A. TESTING THE PROBAND 
This Part compares Testing Periods with the testing models 
manifested by the medieval ordeal. Such comparisons may seem 
far-fetched, given the extent to which ordeals “have lodged them-
selves in the popular mind, as prime examples of the vivid bar-
barism of the Middle Ages.”433 Images from days gone by—of 
priests forcing a trembling suspect to pick up a burning hot iron 
or lowering the body of the accused into a pool of cold water—
fight against any notion of instructive comparison.  
But the judicial ordeal put the defendant through a test to 
determine what kind of justice should be done. According to its 
classic formulation, the ordeal was “an ancient . . . mode of trial, 
in which a suspected person was subjected to some physical test 
fraught with danger, . . . the result being regarded as the imme-
diate judgment of the Deity.”434 Defendants who passed the test 
established themselves as innocent or as deserving of mercy.435 
Those who failed the test heralded their own guilt and unworthi-
ness, revealing the necessity of punishment.436  
The ordeal was in regular use between the ninth and twelfth 
centuries “in every part of Latin Christendom . . . .”437 Over this 
period, for example, English laws prescribed the ordeals of hot 
iron and cold water for a broad range of criminal offenses, from 
murder to simple theft.438 The ordeal functioned in these cases 
as a mode of proof. 
 
 433. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT 60 (2008). In 
a 2008 article, Josh Bowers suggested the medieval ordeal as an analogy to New 
York City drug-court practice, but he did not develop this analogy through a 
similarly detailed examination of scholarship on the ordeal. Josh Bowers, Con-
traindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 821–28 (2008). 
 434. Paul Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common 
Law, in THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL 
E. THORNE 90, 92 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981) (citation omitted). 
 435. Id. at 93–94. 
 436. Id.  
 437. ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER 34 (1986). 
 438. Id. at 25 (noting that the ordeals of hot iron and cold water were “pre-
scribed for a wide range of offenses, including murder, fire-raising, witchcraft, 
and forgery, as well as simple theft”). 
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Although ordeals were conventional features of the judicial 
system, they were reserved for cases in which other forms of ac-
ceptable proof were lacking.439 For this reason, defendants of low 
status or bad reputation were particularly vulnerable to being 
sent to the ordeal. These defendants were subjected to the ordeal 
at higher rates because the law did not consider them “oath-wor-
thy.”440  
In the British Isles, trial by ordeal was the precursor to the 
modern system of trial by jury.441 As James Whitman has em-
phasized: “Historians have long recognized that jury trial first 
emerged as an alternative to the judicial ordeal. Strange as it 
may sound, our law began to take shape when the church set out 
to abolish the painful and frightening ordeals of the hot iron and 
the cold water.”442 In 1215, a decree of the Fourth Lateran Coun-
cil formally ended the use of the ordeal system in England, with 
jury trial taking its place.443 
Given that jury trial replaced the ordeal, it is important to 
investigate whether modern methods of replacing the jury have 
recreated any of the dynamics of the ordeal. This Part analyzes 
how contemporary Testing Periods compare with the ancient 
models that jury trial was designed to replace. The goal is to un-
settle the notion that the procedures used within the criminal 
justice system have developed along a linear path. Because jury 
trial is now used in only a tiny fraction of cases, the outcome-
determination mechanisms that most reflect our criminal justice 
system are not the trials that involve either a jury or the reason-
able doubt standard. Instead, they are the Testing Periods that, 
like the medieval ordeals before them, put the defendant to the 
test, a test that does not evaluate the evidence of the underlying 
criminal allegations.  
The accused who underwent a medieval ordeal was known 
as the “proband,” a word that comes from the same root as pro-
bation.444 Both words derive from the Latin “probare,” which 
 
 439. See id. at 26 (noting that the ordeal “coexisted with many other forms 
of proof ” ). 
 440. See id. at 30–33 (“The higher an individual’s status, the more ‘oath-
worthy’ he would be.”). 
 441. See id. at 9–12 (outlining the history of trial by ordeal). 
 442. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 7. 
 443. BARTLETT, supra note 437, at 2, 34, 125, 144–52 (noting that the ordeal 
was subsequently used in witchcraft cases, but it is not clear if these cases in-
volved a survival or revival of the ordeal model). 
 444. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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means to test or to prove.445 A proband (like a probationer) was 
the person being tested. The outcome of that test determined the 
outcome of the case. 
This Section draws from scholarship on the medieval ordeal 
to provide insights into modern testing arrangements. The Sec-
tion compares the character of the Testing Periods used in each 
system, the purpose and impact of their sorting procedures, and 
the broad discretion afforded test administrators to tilt the out-
come toward either mercy or cruelty.  
B. CHARACTER OF THE TESTING PERIOD 
The ordeal of the hot iron was among the most common 
forms of the medieval ordeal.446 To prepare for this ordeal, the 
accused would fast and pray for three days. On the day of the 
ordeal, which took place in a church, the priest would pick up the 
iron, carry it to a fire, and sprinkle it with holy water.447 As the 
iron was heating, the priest would celebrate mass, calling upon 
“God, the just judge” to “bless and sanctify this fiery iron, which 
is used in the just examination of doubtful issues.”448 At the ap-
pointed moment, the accused would pick up the hot iron, walk a 
set number of paces, and put the iron down.449 The person’s hand 
would then be sealed with bandages.450 After three days, priests 
would inspect the wound. If the wound was “clean”—without dis-
coloration or other marks of infection—the accused was deemed 
vindicated by God’s intervention.451 But if “diseased discharge” 
was “found in the mark of the iron,” the accused would be “led 
forth guilty and unclean” for punishment.452 
 
 445. Proband, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (5th ed. 2016). 
 446. BARTLETT, supra note 437, at 1–2. 
 447. Margaret H. Kerr, Richard D. Forsyth & Michael J. Plyley, Cold Water 
and Hot Iron: Trial by Ordeal in England, 22 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 573, 588 
(1992). 
 448. BARTLETT, supra note 437, at 1. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id.; Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 447, at 588 (noting that if the 
hand was found “clean,” “promise and glory” would be given to God). 
 452. Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 447, at 573, 588 (quoting DIE GE-
SETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN 427–29 (Liebermann ed., reprt. 1960) (1903)) (noting 
that prayers accompanying early forms of this ritual seem to require that the 
hand not be injured at all by the contact with the hot iron). 
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The medieval ordeals of the hot cauldron and cold water also 
were cloaked in layers of religious ceremony.453 In the ordeal of 
the hot cauldron, the oldest recorded form of the ordeal, the ac-
cused was required to reach into a cauldron of boiling water and 
extract a ring or a stone from its depths.454 As part of the lead-
up to the ordeal, the water was “exorcised” to ensure that “he 
who shall place his hand in thee, if his cause be just and true, 
shall receive no hurt; but if he be perjured, let his hand be 
burned with fire . . . .”455 After recovering the object, the person’s 
hand was bound up. If the hand appeared unharmed after three 
days, the person was innocent. If the hand showed signs of fes-
tering, it was proof that God had proclaimed the person guilty.456  
The ritual accompanying the ordeal of the cold water al-
lowed for a more public and immediate verdict. After the requi-
site period of fasting and prayer, the accused would be led in a 
religious procession toward a pool of water. A priest would bless 
the water, and the accused would be lowered in. Those who 
floated were deemed guilty, while those who sank were inno-
cent.457 The water was said to reject the body of the person who 
floated.458  
As the historian Robert Bartlett has explained, the ordeals 
of fire and water were premised on the idea that natural ele-
ments would behave in a predetermined (often unnatural) man-
ner in order to vindicate the accused.459 Through divine inter-
vention, boiling water and red-hot irons would fail to burn the 
hands of the innocent. Divine intervention would also prevent 
water, which had been blessed, from permitting the innocent to 
float to its top. The ordeals relied on divine proof to protect the 
innocent and expose the guilty. 
In describing the grisly details of these ordeals, Bartlett de-
clared that trial by ordeal has “no real counterpart in the modern 
 
 453. Peter T. Leeson, Ordeals, 55 J.L. & ECON. 691, 693 (2012). 
 454. BARTLETT, supra note 437, at 4; Leeson, supra note 453, at 694. 
 455. HENRY C. LEA, SUPERSTITION AND FORCE: ESSAYS ON THE WAGER OF 
LAW—THE WAGER OF BATTLE—THE ORDEAL—TORTURE 246 (1878) (citation 
omitted). 
 456. Leeson, supra note 453, at 694. 
 457. Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 447, at 582–83. 
 458. LEA, supra note 455, at 280 (explaining the basis of the cold water or-
deal was that “the pure element would not receive into its bosom any one stained 
with the crime of a false oath”). 
 459. BARTLETT, supra note 437, at 2 (reporting that trial by ordeal “required 
that the natural elements behave in an unusual way”). 
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world,” and that it is therefore necessary to “stretch our minds 
to understand this custom.”460 Although ordeals by fire and wa-
ter “have been employed by peoples in many different parts of 
the world and throughout history,” these ancient methods of trial 
have long been abandoned by modern society.461 Looking at 
these “dramatically alien practices” through today’s eyes re-
quires an “imaginative leap into a past society.”462 
And yet, while the particulars are much less vivid, routine 
forms of plea bargaining continue to subject defendants to a test: 
one that can be both painful and demanding. Like probands of 
long ago, defendants must show that they can submit themselves 
fully to a higher authority, represented by the courts in this con-
text. Defendants must also demonstrate sufficient fortitude to 
make it through the test, no matter what terms are set for them. 
The mechanisms described in Parts II and III are deployed reg-
ularly, for example, to test whether a defendant can overcome a 
physical addiction to alcohol or drugs.463 Although relapse is 
common among addicts,464 the defendant must be able to over-
come his or her addiction within a set timeframe.465 In order to 
 
 460. Id. at 1. 
 461. Id. at 2. 
 462. Id. at 1. 
 463. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACING ADDICTION 
IN AMERICA: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON AL-
COHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH, at ES-3 (2016), https://addiction.surgeongeneral 
.gov/sites/default/files/executive-summary.pdf (“Historically, our society has 
treated addiction and misuse of alcohol and drugs as symptoms of moral weak-
ness or as a willful rejection of societal norms, and these problems have been 
addressed primarily through the criminal justice system.”). 
 464. See, e.g., id. at I, ES-6 (2016) (finding that addiction is a “chronic neu-
rological disorder” and emphasizing that even if people with addictions “can re-
sist drug or alcohol use for a while, at some point the constant craving triggered 
by the many cues in their life may erode their resolve, resulting in return to 
substance use, or relapse”); Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and 
It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45, 45–47 (1997) (describing addiction as a brain dis-
ease that is chronic and relapsing in nature); A. Thomas McLellan, et al., Drug 
Dependence, a Chronic Medical Illness, 284 JAMA 1689, 1691, 1693 (2000) (de-
scribing “loss of control” as a “hallmark” of drug and alcohol dependence and a 
forty to sixty percent relapse rate post-treatment). 
 465. See, e.g., MARIANNE MOLLMANN ET AL., PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR TREATMENT: DRUG COURTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 16 (2017), https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/phr_drugcourts_ 
report_singlepages.pdf (emphasizing that positive drug tests still result in pun-
ishment in many drug courts, despite medical recommendations to the con-
trary). 
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prevail, the defendant must behave in a manner that defies the 
normal expectations about what it means to be addicted.466  
A preoccupation with sorting people for being “clean” per-
vades both systems. In the ordeals of the hot iron and hot caul-
dron, the priests administering the ordeal inspected the pro-
bands’ wounds to see whether they were clean. The ordeal of the 
cold water used water that had been blessed—a symbol of purity 
and cleanliness—to identify and expel the guilty. In a parallel 
fashion, modern testing models monitor whether or not a defend-
ant’s body is “clean” from drugs and alcohol. The defendant uri-
nates into a cup at regular intervals in front of a probation officer 
to be tested for intoxicants. The probation officer is then charged 
with overseeing the examination of the urine and reporting if it 
is dirty or clean. A failed test is referred to as a “dirty urine.”467 
The administration of the medieval ordeal was sensitive to 
the status and reputation of the accused. An accused of high sta-
tus might avoid the ordeal altogether by swearing an oath to es-
tablish his or her innocence.468 But the lower a person’s status 
and the more doubtful his or her character, the more likely that 
an ordeal would be required.469  
The difficulty of the ordeal could also be increased, depend-
ing not only on the severity of the allegations but on the “extent 
 
 466. For a judge who has taken a different approach by deciding to avoid 
“punishment by incarceration merely for habitual marijuana use” in supervised 
release cases, see United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d. 337, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018) (Weinstein, J.). 
 467. See, e.g., Lunsford v. United States, No. 2:13-CV-25090, 2015 WL 
7871355, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 4, 2015) (describing a positive drug test as 
“dirty urine”); Commonwealth v. Herring, No. 871 WDA 2013, 2014 WL 
11022459, at *6 (Pa. Super Ct. Jan. 24, 2014) (recounting a judge warning that 
“even one dirty urine test would result in incarceration”); Allegra M. McLeod, 
Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1587, 1615 (2012) (referring to a positive drug test as “dirty urine 
test”). 
 468. See, e.g., BARTLETT, supra note 437, at 33. 
 469. See id. (emphasizing that an important dimension of the ordeal was “its 
use against the servile classes. Unless special arrangements were made for the 
lord to stand for them, the unfree were not allowed to enter fully the legal world 
of oath-swearing and compurgation”); Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 447, 
at 574 (“Hurnard has argued convincingly that compurgation, the swearing of 
an oath by the accused and a prescribed number of reputable oath-helpers (often 
twelve), was until 1166, the normal method of proof, replaced by the ordeal only 
in certain circumstances; for example, when the accused was not of good char-
acter.”); Leeson, supra note 453, at 695 (noting that unfree persons, foreigners, 
persons who had perjured themselves, those who had failed in a legal contest, 
and those with tarnished reputations had unacceptable oaths). 
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of the defendant’s disrepute.”470 In the ordeal of the hot iron, for 
example, the proband might have to walk for nine paces with a 
one-pound iron (the “simple ordeal”), a two-pound iron (the “two-
fold ordeal”) or a three-pound iron (the “threefold ordeal”).471 In 
the ordeal of the hot cauldron, the proband might need to sub-
merge a hand into the boiling water and continue up to the wrist 
(the “simple ordeal”), continue up to a point between the wrist 
and the elbow (the “twofold ordeal”), or continue up to the elbow 
(the “threefold ordeal”).472 A person’s low status was used both 
to trigger the need for the ordeal and to intensify the nature of 
the test.  
A similar framework of escalating challenge, contingent on 
the defendant’s status and reputation, is imposed in modern-day 
testing models. The difficulty of the test can be adjusted simply 
by imposing more conditions or heightening the level of supervi-
sion.473 A judge or prosecutor might require more frequent drug 
testing, set a curfew, impose a no-arrest condition, forbid the per-
son from associating with anyone with a felony conviction, pro-
hibit any contact with a spouse (even when the spouse actively 
seeks such contact), enforce a no-lateness policy for all court 
dates and treatment appointments, or require the person to live 
in a house where no other resident possesses alcohol. The inten-
sity of supervision for a violation can then be enhanced through 
measures like increased reporting, unpredictable searches, ir-
regular home visits, surprise work visits, GPS monitoring, pro-
bation sweeps, and the use of lie-detector tests. 
The contemporary version of measuring a defendant’s status 
and reputation is done largely through risk assessment tools.474 
 
 470. Leeson, supra note 453, at 694 n.7. 
 471. RICHARD HART, ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS OF ENGLAND, IRELAND, AND 
SCOTLAND FROM THE FIFTH CENTURY TILL THE REFORMATION 362 (1876). 
 472. Id.; LEA, supra note 455, at 253. 
 473. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Doleac, Study After Study Shows Ex-Prisoners 
Would Be Better Off Without Intense Supervision, BROOKINGS (July 2, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/07/02/study-after-study-shows 
-ex-prisoners-would-be-better-off-without-intense-supervision (criticizing in-
tensive supervision—in the form of more rules and more enforcement of those 
rules—because requiring “lots of meetings, drug tests, and so on can complicate 
a client’s life, making it more difficult to get to work or school or care for family 
members (meetings are often scheduled at inconvenient times and may be far 
away)”). 
 474. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., RESPONSIVE COMMUNITIES INITIA-
TIVE, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, HARVARD LAW SCH., ALGO-
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Factors that can increase a defendant’s risk score include prior 
convictions,475 lack of employment,476 poor educational his-
tory,477 evidence of juvenile delinquency, and an unstable living 
environment.478 Risk scores can also go up if defendants have 
parents or friends with criminal records479 or if they voice an 
opinion that a probation officer believes is representative of 
“criminal thinking.”480 On the other hand, high status markers 
such as being married, having a college education, or owning 
one’s own home are used to lower a defendant’s risk score.481  
 
RITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE USE OF RISK ASSESS-
MENTS IN SENTENCING (2017); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and 
the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 
(2014) (noting that some jurisdictions are “directing sentencing judges to explic-
itly consider a variety of variables that often include socioeconomic status, gen-
der, age, family, and neighborhood characteristics . . . routinely, in all cases” 
through risk assessment tools). 
 475. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Crimi-
nal History on Risk Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 77 (2015) (“[A] 
personal history of criminal conduct is the most common type of factor across 
risk assessment tools.”). 
 476. Wisconsin’s Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alterna-
tive Sanctions (COMPAS) Risk Assessment questionnaire asks whether the de-
fendant currently has a job, how much he or she has worked in the last twelve 
months, whether he or she has ever been fired, how often he or she has “barely 
enough money to get by,” how often he or she has trouble paying bills, and how 
often he or she worries about financial survival. NORTHPOINTE, SAMPLE  
COMPAS RISK ASSESSMENT 5–6 (2011) [hereinafter COMPAS], https://assets 
.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103/Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS 
-CORE.pdf. 
 477. See, e.g., LATESSA ET AL., CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, UNIV. 
OF CINCINNATI, CREATION AND VALIDATION OF THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT 
SYSTEM FINAL REPORT 51 (2009) [hereinafter ORAS], https://cech.uc.edu/ 
content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/reports/project_reports/ORAS_Final_Report.pdf 
(weighing whether defendants have a high school diploma and whether they 
have a history of suspension or expulsion); COMPAS, supra note 476, at 5 (ask-
ing questions about education level, suspension or expulsion history, grades in 
school, conflicts with teachers, skipping classes, and fights at school).  
 478. See ORAS, supra note 477, at 29, 49, 52, 57 (weighing factors like 
whether the defendant has lived in the same residence for the past six months, 
whether the defendant lives in a high crime area, and whether drugs are readily 
available in the neighborhood); COMPAS, supra note 476, at 4 (asking whether 
defendant has moved in the last few months, has a regular living situation, and 
has a telephone).  
 479. ORAS, supra note 477, at 29, 52–53, 55; COMPAS, supra note 476, at 
3. 
 480. See, e.g., COMPAS, supra note 476, at 7–8 (questioning individuals 
about “criminal personality,” “anger,” and “criminal attitudes”). 
 481. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44087, RISK AND NEEDS 
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Like in the ordeal model, the results of a risk assessment 
instrument can affect both whether the defendant has to under-
take any Testing Period at all and the terms to which a defend-
ant must submit. Courts use risk assessment instruments to de-
cide what sentence is necessary, including whether or not to 
require a Testing Period and under what terms.482 Once a person 
is in a Testing Period, probation officers can use risk assessment 
instruments to decide how closely to monitor the person for a 
violation and what treatment (or other) obligations to impose.483 
These decisions are deeply significant because of the evidence 
demonstrating that more surveillance leads predictably to more 
violations.484  
The result is an elaborate virtue-testing system that is 
deeply contingent on status. Defendants must demonstrate their 
virtue by achieving standards of conduct that are not imposed on 
the rest of society.485 And people of the lowest status are subject 
to the highest standards of all. 
C. FUNCTION OF THE TESTING PERIOD 
Many of the purposes served by the ordeal are also served 
by the various testing mechanisms I have discussed in this Arti-
cle. 
James Whitman has explained how premodern law, includ-
ing the law of the ordeal, relied heavily on what he called “moral 
comfort procedures.”486 A key feature of the ordeal was that God 
 
ASSESSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2015) (noting that most in-
struments “punish people for choices that people are allowed to make in a free 
society (e.g., whether to get married, live in a stable residence, or have a regular 
job)”); James Austin, The Proper and Improper Use of Risk Assessment in Cor-
rections, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 197 tbl.5 (2004) (noting that being unmarried 
at the time of the offense or never having been married are factors used in pre-
dicting recidivism and that a higher education level means a lower rate of re-
cidivism); Starr, supra note 474, at 813 (“An unemployed high school dropout 
will score three points worse than an employed high school graduate.”). 
 482. Doherty, supra note 282, at 353. 
 483. See id. at 308. 
 484. MICHAEL TONRY & MARY LYNCH, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 101 
(1996). 
 485. In the words of one drug court judge, “The whole idea is to see if you 
can do things like follow rules, because if you can follow rules, then that gives 
the court some hope that you can do things like obey laws.” Shaila Dewan, Pro-
bation May Sound Light, but Punishments Can Land Hard, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/03/us/probation-sounding-light-can 
-land-hard.html. 
 486. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 13. 
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would participate directly in the events and issue the final judg-
ment against a proband.487 This framework functioned as a re-
sponsibility-shifting measure that protected those who had ad-
ministered the ordeal from considering themselves accountable 
for the outcome.488 It provided moral comfort by allowing these 
administrators to deny their agency even when a proband was 
put to death or lost a limb as a consequence of failing the or-
deal.489  
Modern testing models also function as moral comfort pro-
cedures. Instead of God issuing the final judgment, however, the 
system is engineered to ensure that defendants bear sole moral 
responsibility for the outcome of their cases. They are given an 
opportunity to “escape” prison as long as they follow an agreed-
upon set of rules. If they lack the “self-discipline” or “will” to fol-
low these rules, the system semantically places responsibility for 
the failure squarely on their own shoulders. 
These testing models provide judges and prosecutors with a 
method of sorting cases for punishment in a manner that allows 
them to deny their own agency in the outcome. The defendant is 
said to have “agreed” to the rules, even when it is clear that the 
defendant had no power to shape the content of those rules or to 
control their application. Imprisoning a defendant for a violation 
is then seen by the judge and prosecutor as the dispassionate 
enforcement of a contract, one in which they are morally dis-
tanced from the outcome. Indeed, the judge and prosecutor can 
continue to see themselves as progressive actors, the ones who 
gave the defendant a chance. 
One outwardly distinctive feature of modern testing mod-
els—the frequent requirement that a defendant plead guilty be-
fore undergoing the Testing Period—does not distinguish them 
from the ordeal upon closer analysis. Scholarship on the ordeal 
has revealed that most people sent to the ordeal were already 
believed to be guilty.490 As Roger Groot has demonstrated, the 
legal framework of the ordeal came to incorporate a jury of pre-
sentment that was charged with two functions: “identif[ying] 
 
 487. Id. at 17. 
 488. Id. at 16–17. 
 489. Id. 
 490. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 66 (“[Evidence] suggest[s] that these low-
status persons [sent to the ordeal] were often regarded as obviously guilty.”); 
Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 447, at 578 (“Arguably, only those generally 
believed by the jurors to be guilty went to the ordeal . . . .”). 
  
2019] TESTING PERIODS 1783 
 
persons about whom there was suspicion” and forming an opin-
ion upon “the accuracy of the accusation[s].”491 Thus, in Groot’s 
words, “the suspect was not adjudged the ordeal until there was 
a jury ‘verdict’ that he was guilty.”492 Contrary to popular under-
standings of the ordeal, it was not used primarily to resolve fac-
tual uncertainties about a proband’s guilt.493 Indeed, scholars 
have emphasized that “[a]lmost none of the ‘uncertainty’ that 
supposedly drove the courts to ask God’s opinion is visible” in the 
records of these courts.494  
Instead, the ordeal, like modern day testing models, was 
used to sort people for punishment. Those who failed the ordeal 
would be put to death or ordered to forfeit an arm or a foot.495 
But those who succeeded did not necessarily escape all punish-
ment. Individuals who passed the ordeal, but who had the “worst 
reputation[s],” were still forced to abjure the realm.496 Those pre-
sented on minor offenses were allowed to remain in the country 
upon passing the ordeal, as long as they could find “pledges” for 
their future good conduct.497 
God’s intervention exposed whether the proband was de-
serving of mercy. The ordeal was meant to illuminate the true 
content of a person’s character, rather than to uncover any par-
ticular fact about this or that crime.498 As Peter Brown has em-
phasized, within the “controlled miracle” of the ordeal, “God is 
revealing ‘truth,’ not any specific fact. He was judging the status 
of a person or of a group, whether they and their claims were 
 
 491. Roger D. Groot, The Jury of Presentment Before 1215, 26 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 1, 2 (1982). 
 492. Id. at 2. 
 493. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 73; Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The 
Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 
123 (2000). 
 494. Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 447, at 577. 
 495. Naomi D. Hurnard, The Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Claren-
don, 56 ENG. HIST. REV. 374, 396, 400–01 n.3 (1941); Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, 
supra note 447, at 578–79. 
 496. Hurnard, supra note 495, at 396. 
 497. Id. 
 498. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 80 (citation omitted); see also Olson, supra 
note 493, at 121 (“Historians’ insistence that the medieval Deity was a fact-
finder leaves unfathomable a host of literature, which speaks of the Divine pro-
tecting the guilty proband by cloaking evidence or ensuring that he succeeded 
at his ordeal.”). 
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‘pure’ and ‘just.’”499 The ordeal revealed “things that are hidden 
or unknown,” through “the judgments of Him who alone knows 
the hearts of the sons of men.”500 By revealing the “heart” of the 
accused, God was exposing whether the accused was worthy of 
mercy or deserving of punishment. 
Modern Testing Periods are likewise vehicles for sorting 
people for punishment. The loose process and standards that ap-
ply during revocation hearings501 make clear that the core func-
tion of these proceedings is not the rigorous adjudication of fact. 
Instead, the testing process is meant to reveal the “truth” about 
the defendant’s character, establishing what (if any) punishment 
is merited. 
A more ominous interpretation of this “truth-seeking” func-
tion was suggested by Hermann Nottarp, an influential German 
scholar of the Nazi era.502 In a book published in 1949, Nottarp 
argued that the real purpose of the ordeal was to uncover “de-
generate” members of the Volk so that they could be excluded 
from the medieval Teutonic community.503 Under this theory, de-
generate people could be identified through the ordeal because 
they were unable to withstand the pain and horror it entailed, 
unlike healthier members of the community.504 
Using this framework, it could be argued that plea bargain-
ing models that are built around substance abuse testing are a 
method of identifying “degenerates” who are hopelessly addicted 
to drugs or alcohol. Beginning with Augustus, probation-derived 
pleas have allowed courts to identify those individuals who con-
tinue to use drugs or alcohol even when they know they are being 
watched.505 Courts can then use these markers of true addiction 
to support lengthy prison terms that remove these “broken 
down” people from the community. 
 
 499. Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change, 104 
DAEDALUS 133, 137 (1975). 
 500. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 80 (citation omitted). 
 501. See supra Parts II & III for a discussion of legal standards. See also 
Doherty, supra note 88, at 990 (“The rights adopted in Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972)] did not include the presumption of innocence or a requirement 
that a parole [or a probation] violation be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
There was no right to a jury determination, no compulsory process, no exclu-
sionary rule requirement, and no double jeopardy protection.”). 
 502. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 68–69 (citation omitted). 
 503. Id.  
 504. Id. at 69. 
 505. See discussion of Augustus’s methodology supra Part I. 
  
2019] TESTING PERIODS 1785 
 
Drug courts have been criticized for operating along these 
lines, deploying a bait and switch approach to addiction. In an 
analysis of New York drug courts, for example, Josh Bowers has 
described how addicts are induced to participate by “overly 
sunny images of seemingly inevitable therapeutic success: [t]he 
interactive and personable judge, the kinder and gentler prose-
cutor, and the rhetoric of disease and cure.”506 But once the ad-
dict begins to fail in treatment, a “switch is thrown” and the 
court reverts back to its traditional punishment frame.507 Stud-
ies of New York’s drug courts have shown that those who re-
vealed themselves to be true addicts have been subjected to 
prison sentences two to five times longer than those applied to 
conventionally adjudicated defendants.508 
In this context, the requirement of an upfront guilty plea 
can be seen as serving a moral comfort function, in addition to 
all of its other functions. As previously noted, requiring a defend-
ant to plead guilty in order to receive the fixed opportunity of 
avoiding prison is useful on many levels: it avoids the need for 
costly jury trials, results in reliable “wins” for prosecutors, pro-
tects prosecutors and judges from the possibility of reversal on 
appeal, and eases the workload for all system players.509 But the 
upfront guilty plea also takes moral pressure off judges and pros-
ecutors during the Testing Period. From an ethical perspective, 
it is much easier to insist on adherence to a set of demanding 
rules when dealing with the already guilty, rather than with the 
presumptively innocent. The guilty plea creates a psychic dis-
tance that facilitates the administration of the test. 
At the same time, however, it is important to emphasize that 
modern Testing Periods—like the ordeal—are attractive because 
they do create a real procedural opportunity for the accused. 
Seen from a wide vantage point, the ordeal was a liberalizing 
mechanism because it allowed a low-status person, a person who 
was not considered “oath-worthy,” to “take God as his wit-
ness.”510 As Whitman has noted: “[A]wful as it was, the ordeal 
actually conferred a procedural benefit on its low-status victims, 
 
 506. Bowers, supra note 433, at 812; see id. at 808–16 (analyzing how addicts 
are particularly vulnerable to making inadvisable decisions about their likeli-
hood of success in these courts). 
 507. Id. at 788. 
 508. Id. at 792. 
 509. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 1040–43. 
 510. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 63. 
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allowing them to give testimony, with God as their witness, as 
though they were persons of high social standing.”511 In a similar 
vein, modern Testing Periods create a procedure that allows de-
fendants to avoid the uncertainties and dangers of jury trial. In 
its place, defendants are offered a structured opportunity 
through plea bargaining to avoid the thing they fear most: being 
sent to prison.  
D. CONTROLLING THE PENDULUM BETWEEN MERCY AND 
CRUELTY 
Despite its fearsome reputation, the medieval ordeal was 
mainly a vehicle of mercy.512 Most people who underwent the or-
deal made it through successfully.513 The high passage rate has 
long puzzled scholars; it is not clear how so many probands man-
aged to avoid infection after submerging their hands into boiling 
water or after carrying a burning hot iron. As discussed below, 
the recorded outcomes have led to speculation that the priests, 
who were in charge of administering the ordeal, found ways to 
manipulate the results to allow probands to succeed.514  
If ordeals were trials in which God mostly chose mercy, it is 
not clear that modern Testing Periods have achieved the same 
ratio of mercy to harshness. In part, this ratio is unclear because 
state courts often do not publish (or even keep) statistics on the 
use of “on-file” mechanisms, making it impossible to evaluate 
their overall impact. But judging from the experience of problem-
solving courts, a subset that does track outcomes, the failure 
rates can be very high.515 Data tracking with regard to sentences 
of probation is also difficult because probation systems mostly 
 
 511. Id. (citation omitted); see also Colin Morris, Judicium Dei: The Social 
and Political Significance of the Ordeal in the Eleventh Century, in 12 CHURCH 
SOCIETY AND POLITICS 96 (Derek Baker ed., 1975) (“[W]hen a defendant could 
not prove his innocence by oath, he could resort to the ordeal, and thus call God 
to witness . . . .”). 
 512. WHITMAN, supra note 433, at 65; Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 
447, at 574. 
 513. F.W. Maitland, Introduction to 1 SELDON SOC’Y, SELECT PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN, VOL. I, A.D. 1200–1225, at xxiv (F.W. Maitland ed., 1888) (explaining 
that “success at the ordeal” was “far commoner than failure”); Kerr, Forsyth & 
Plyley, supra note 447, at 580. 
 514. FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I VOL. II, at 599 (2d ed. 1959) 
(1898); Leeson, supra note 453, at 705. 
 515. See supra Parts II.B.4 & III.B.3.  
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operate on a county-by-county basis.516 The information that 
does exist indicates that probation revocation is a leading cause 
of incarceration in the United States.517 
One explanation for the high failure rates is the freewheel-
ing indeterminacy that has been built into the system.518 In 
many states, judges are permitted to impose any condition that 
they believe “relates to” a defendant’s “rehabilitation.”519 To com-
plement this broad mandate, judges are also permitted to 
ratchet up the punishment for any failure to meet one of these 
conditions. The swings in punishment discussed in this Article 
have been as long as ten or twenty years.520 
“Rehabilitation,” meanwhile, is a notoriously slippery con-
cept. Its ambiguity preoccupied the leading critics of America’s 
last great experiment with indeterminate sentencing, between 
the 1870s and the 1970s.521 In pushing for a more determinate 
sentencing regime, these critics warned that the failure to set 
limits on the definition of rehabilitation meant there were no 
boundaries on what could be demanded in its name.522 
Scholars warned that indeterminate sentences were being 
used to exact even more punishment in the guise of “therapy” or 
 
 516. See MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 62, at 5. 
 517. See id. at 4 (noting thirty to forty percent of prison admissions over the 
last twenty years have been attributable to “recalls” from probation and parole 
revocations). 
 518. The risk aversion of administrators also factors in high failure rates. 
See Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision103 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1061 (2013) (“In a world where risk aversion defines 
supervisory practices in many jurisdictions, allowing boilerplate rules to be im-
posed on probationers and parolees creates conditions in which costly and un-
necessary revocation can occur.”). 
 519. See, e.g., State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Conn. 1997) (“By allow-
ing the trial court to impose ‘any other conditions reasonably related to [the de-
fendant’s] rehabilitation’ . . . the legislature authorized the court to impose any 
condition that would help to secure the defendant’s reformation. This broad 
power is consistent with the general goals of probation.” (alteration in original)). 
 520. See, e.g., State v. Quattrucci, No. CR03187707, 2006 WL 618415, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2006) (ten year swing in Connecticut); People v. 
McCaslin, 30 N.E.3d 1104, 1106 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (ten year swing in Illinois); 
Green v. State, 242 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. App. 2007) (twenty year swing in 
Texas). 
 521. See generally Fisher, supra note 4, at 1046 n.731, 1056 (noting that the 
first substantial experiment with indeterminate sentencing occurred in New 
York in 1877, and that there was very little indeterminacy left when California 
“abandoned its experiment with the indeterminate sentence in 1976”). 
 522. PAUL LERMAN, COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 80 
(1975). 
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“benevolence” or “helping.” Writing in 1981, for example, Francis 
Allen (the preeminent scholar of the “rehabilitative ideal”) dis-
sected the problems generated by “[t]he assumption of the be-
nevolent purpose of the rehabilitative regime and the highly sub-
jective and ill-defined notions of how rehabilitation is to be 
achieved and of what it consists[.]”523 In an earlier book, Allen 
emphasized that “in practice, there is a strong tendency for the 
rehabilitative ideal to serve purposes that are essentially inca-
pacitative rather than therapeutic in character.”524 Rehabilita-
tive theory serves as a camouflage for punitive measures because 
of “the tendency of those engaged in rehabilitative efforts to de-
fine as therapy anything that a therapist does.”525 As a conse-
quence, rehabilitative regimes tend to “inflict larger depriva-
tions of liberty and volition” on their subjects than programs that 
are more overtly punitive.526  
The tendency of indeterminate regimes to drift toward the 
use of unchecked discretion was another area of concern. In an 
influential 1969 book, Kenneth Culp Davis railed against the 
“completely unstructured discretionary power” exercised by the 
federal parole board at the time.527 Davis, a leading administra-
tive law scholar, stressed that “[d]iscretion is a tool only when 
properly used; like an axe, it can be a weapon for mayhem or 
murder.”528 Ernest van den Haag was similarly critical of allow-
ing decisions about the rehabilitative “needs” of a convict to be 
derived from the administrators’ “own notions about proper be-
havior and lifestyle.”529 
On the other hand, one need not delve very far into the his-
tory of the ordeal to discover how important discretion can be in 
the administration of a difficult test. In the ordeal of the cold 
water, it was not self-evident how far beneath the water the pro-
band needed to remain in order to show that God was on his or 
her side.530 Some judges decided that it was enough if the pro-
band’s body was covered by water; they did not agree with those 
 
 523. ALLEN, supra note 145, at 48. 
 524. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35 (1964). 
 525. ALLEN, supra note 145, at 48, 54. 
 526. Id. at 49. 
 527. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY IN-
QUIRY 126 (1969). 
 528. Id. at 25. 
 529. ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY 
OLD AND VERY PAINFUL QUESTION 186 (1975). 
 530. LEA, supra note 455, at 280. 
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who insisted that the accused must sink all the way down to the 
bottom of a pool.531 Some judges also chose to overlook the prob-
lems created by the buoyancy of human hair. They concluded 
that because the hair was an “excrement of the body,” it had the 
“privilege of floating without convicting its owner[.]”532 
Priests also found other ways of tilting the ordeal to the pro-
band’s advantage. Peter Leeson has explained, for example, that 
a priest, who wanted a proband to succeed, could simply manip-
ulate the strength of the fire that lay underneath the cauldron 
or iron.533 The ritual accompanying these hot ordeals also gave 
priests wide latitude to determine whether a proband’s wounds 
were “clean or foul,” permitting a sympathetic priest to influence 
the results.534 Margaret Kerr has suggested that the cold water 
ordeal was rarely deployed against women in practice because 
women’s bodies were more likely than men’s bodies to float.535 
When administering a difficult test, discretion was (and is) 
essential for both mercy and cruelty. A prosecutor in a modern 
day Testing Period might agree to look the other way if a defend-
ant, who is generally doing ok, continues to test positive for ma-
rijuana. A judge might refuse to go along with a system in which 
the punishment for a homeless defendant’s crime depends (even 
in the abstract) on whether he or she can make it to an appoint-
ment on time. 
Judges and prosecutors can also decide to exercise discretion 
on a more systematic level.536 They could decline to use the fact 
of an arrest to justify enhanced punishment or opt out of “model” 
contracts that require vulnerable defendants to waive their due 
process rights upfront. They could also refuse to rely on risk as-
sessment instruments that measure people’s “risk scores” by fac-
tors like whether a parent has a criminal record—or that depend 
on some unaccountable person’s views of whether a defendant 
exhibited “criminal thinking” during an interview.537 
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For in the end, it was a concern about the church’s own sin 
that put an end to the ordeal. In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Coun-
cil prohibited members of the clergy from participating in the 
ordeal.538 As Bartlett explains, there had been a rising discom-
fort in certain ecclesiastic circles about whether it was right to 
use the ordeal as a method of trial.539 The principal objections 
were that the ordeal did not have a basis in scripture and that it 
was sinful to use a manufactured test to try to force God’s 
hand.540  
A similar reawakening about moral responsibility—of the 
test’s administrators, rather than its subjects—could be useful 
in reevaluating modern-day testing systems. Because discretion 
makes it lawful to be either merciful or cruel, the people who 
exercise that discretion must see themselves as morally respon-
sible for the decisions that they make. In moral terms, for exam-
ple, it is problematic to defend harsh outcomes as the product of 
a freely negotiated “contract.” Given the depths of the power they 
have accumulated, those who create and oversee modern Testing 
Periods are (and must be publicly viewed as) morally accounta-
ble for the terms that they have set. 
As I have explored elsewhere, the founding theorists of in-
determinate sentencing would have never supported testing 
models that were so loose or so broad.541 Although they believed 
that penal programs could be designed in a manner that would 
inspire defendants to achieve meaningful reform, they were ad-
amant about imposing rigorous standards on program adminis-
trators to ensure their accountability and transparency.542 In 
particular, the “architect of the indeterminacy movement,”543 Al-
exander Maconochie, emphasized how wrong it would be to sub-
ject people to conditions that would leave them exposed to the 
discretionary will of a “malicious constable, or a single irritable 
 
that “a devotion to science” provide[s] “sufficient protection against unwar-
ranted invasion of individual rights”). 
 538. Kerr, Forsyth & Plyley, supra note 447, at 573. 
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 540. Id. at 86. 
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magistrate.”544 These concerns, as voiced in the 1830s, are still 
just as vital today, although they have never succeeded in hold-
ing lasting sway over the many decades of experiments with the 
indeterminate sentencing model. 
  CONCLUSION   
Through this Article, I have illuminated the role of Testing 
Periods in shifting the orientation of decision making in criminal 
cases and setting the criteria that determine case outcomes. I 
have shown how Testing Periods expand the range of options in 
plea negotiation, help sideline the jury by encouraging guilty 
pleas, and create indeterminate sentencing authority for judges 
and prosecutors. The use of Testing Periods is now so pervasive 
that the day-to-day operations of the criminal justice system fo-
cus heavily on sorting defendants for their ability to comply with 
a set of prospective rules, rather than on laying out evidence for 
a jury (or judge) to consider. 
This Article has focused on Testing Periods that follow 
guilty pleas, but these Testing Periods are only part of the puz-
zle. The same rules that I consider in this Article appear in many 
other testing regimes, including those set up by pretrial diver-
sionary programs, bail systems, protective orders, and parole 
boards.545 The rules and dynamics of all such Testing Periods 
deserve careful analysis and scrutiny. 
There must be a renewed emphasis on examining what we 
are testing people for—and whether the criteria governing Test-
ing Periods are defensible, and if so, how. It is essential to con-
sider, for example, how the inability to conquer an addiction 
should relate to the punishment that a person receives and un-
der what terms it is appropriate to use a new arrest (standing 
alone) as the basis for sorting someone into prison. Who should 
bear responsibility for the possibility of error in the administra-
tion of these kinds of Testing Periods? And are the same stand-
ards applicable to all, and equally? 
 
 544. Id. at 969 (quoting ALEXANDER MACONOCHIE, AUSTRALIANA: 
THOUGHTS ON CONVICT MANAGEMENT AND OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH 
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comply with bail conditions, for example, as a sorting mechanism to decide how 
to handle that defendant’s criminal case. Violations of bail conditions can also 
provide prosecutors with the basis for a new criminal charge and easy convic-
tion, such as for the “crime” of failure to appear in court. 
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Moral responsibility means providing clear answers to these 
types of questions before subjecting others, especially the most 
vulnerable, to an ordeal. As Bartlett emphasized when studying 
the history and purpose of the medieval ordeal system, “a true 
grasp of [the system’s] nature” provides “a deep and penetrating 
insight into the society which practised it.”546 
 
 
 546. BARTLETT, supra note 437, at 1. 
